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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRIME 
PREVENTION: CAN WE AGREE ON A PERFORMANCE METRIC? 
by 
 
Jayesh D’Souza 
 
Florida International University, 2009 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Howard Frank, Major Professor 
The attempts at carrying out terrorist attacks have become more prevalent. As a 
result, an increasing number of countries have become particularly vigilant against the 
means by which terrorists raise funds to finance their draconian acts against human life 
and property. Among the many counter-terrorism agencies in operation, governments 
have set up financial intelligence units (FIUs) within their borders for the purpose of 
tracking down terrorists’ funds. By investigating reported suspicious transactions, FIUs 
attempt to weed out financial criminals who use these illegal funds to finance terrorist 
activity.  
The prominent role played by FIUs means that their performance is always under 
the spotlight. By interviewing experts and conducting surveys of those associated with 
the fight against financial crime, this study investigated perceptions of FIU performance 
on a comparative basis between American and non-American FIUs. The target group of 
experts included financial institution personnel, civilian agents, law enforcement 
personnel, academicians, and consultants. Questions for the interview and surveys were  
 vi 
based on the Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (BSC) methodology. One of the 
objectives of this study was to help determine the suitability of the BSC to this arena. 
While FIUs in this study have concentrated on performance by measuring outputs 
such as the number of suspicious transaction reports investigated, this study calls for a 
focus on outcomes involving all the parties responsible for financial criminal 
investigations. It is only through such an integrated approach that these various entities 
will be able to improve performance in solving financial crime. Experts in financial 
intelligence strongly believed that the quality and timeliness of intelligence was more 
important than keeping track of the number of suspicious transaction reports. Finally, this 
study concluded that the BSC could be appropriately applied to the arena of financial 
crime prevention even though the emphasis is markedly different from that in the private 
sector. While priority in the private sector is given to financial outcomes, in this arena 
employee growth and internal processes were perceived as most important in achieving a 
satisfactory outcome. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the problem of terrorist financing and related areas of 
financial crime. Traditionally, financial crime ―involve[d]: 1) transactions to avoid 
government-imposed impediments to the efficient conduct of business and to avoid 
taxation; and 2) criminal transactions involving drugs, robbery, contract murder, 
prostitution, racketeering, and the like – basically economically motivated criminal 
activities."
1
 In more recent times, it has come to include raising funds to finance terrorist 
activity. During the recent past, the public has been deluged with reports about the 
negative consequences of terrorism. This study specifically focuses on financial crime 
that has come under the microscope lately: those that relate to the financing of terrorist 
activity including money laundering and to a lesser extent, tax evasion. Besides 
impacting individuals and commercial interests, financial crime of this nature adversely 
affects national economic systems as a whole. The Interpol website outlines the 
importance of countering financial crime due to its potential economic impact on the 
individual, corporations and economies.
2
  
Issues pertaining to terrorism created new challenges for public administrators 
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 when four commercial jets were hijacked 
                                                 
1
.  Ingo Walter, The Secret Money Market: IinsideThe Dark World Of Tax Evasion,Financial 
Fraud,Iinsider Trading, Money Laundering, And Capital Flight (New York : Harper & Row, Ballinger 
Division 1990). 
 
2. Interpol, ―Financial Crime,‖ August 25, 2005. [cited on September 10, 2005] Available from World Wide 
Web: (http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/Default.asp). 
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and three of them were crashed into significant landmarks in the United States.
3
 This 
created a sense of vulnerability which was heightened around the world after bombings 
of civilian targets in Bali, London and Madrid. While focus has mainly been on the 
United States after the attacks there, other Western countries have been also been on a 
constant state of alert. Then Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, claimed that even 
before the bombings in neighboring, Indonesia, on October 12, 2002, Al Qaeda had 
explored targets for destruction in Australia in 2000 or 2001.
4
 At the other end of the 
globe, Canada faced its own experience with peril. An account of domestic terrorism by 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation cited a Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
report that Al Qaeda recruits were being trained in Canada.
5
 A year later, in 2006, the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested seventeen men who were allegedly planning 
bomb attacks on targets around Southern Ontario.
6
 
Europe has not been spared either. The United Kingdom has had a history of 
terrorist attacks, the most notorious, in recent memory being those committed by the Irish 
Republican Army and the suicide bombings on the London public transport system on 
                                                 
3
.  CNN, ―Terror Attacks Hit U.S.,‖ September 11, 2001. [cited on March 29, 2007]  Available from World 
Wide Web: (http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/worldtrade.crash/index.html). 
 
4
.  USA Today, ―Al-Qaeda plotted strikes in Australia before 9/11,‖ June 3, 2003. [cited on December 12, 
2005]  Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2003-05-29-australia-
alqaeda_x.htm). 
 
5
. CBC, ―Al-Qaeda's Canadian recruits 'highly prized': report,‖ May 2005. [cited on December 12, 2005]  
Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/05/14/alqaeda-
canada050514.html). 
 
6
. CTV, ―RCMP arrests 17, foiling alleged Ontario bomb plot,‖ June 3, 2006. [cited on March 20, 2007]  
Available from World Wide Web: 
(http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060603/toronto_arrests_060603/20060603/). 
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July 7, 2005 that left approximately 52 civilians dead and 700 of them injured.
7
 In other 
parts of Europe, police have made related arrests. In 2004, Dutch police arrested terrorist 
suspects of a radical Muslim network in the Hague, Amsterdam and Amersfoort.
8
 
Terrorism is a problem with no borders. 
Many countries have already established financial crime-fighting systems within 
and across borders to monitor and minimize this menace.  These include the set-up of 
units within governmental agencies to deal exclusively with crime of this nature 
highlighting the importance of dealing with the problem. For example, in the United 
States, the tax-collection agency, the Internal Revenue Service of the U.S. Treasury 
Department, has a Criminal Investigation unit that investigates financial crime and the 
U.S. Secret Service has a Financial Crimes division with the same mandate. At the 
international level, the United States is a member of Interpol which is an international 
police force that works globally to counter money laundering among other crime. 
Understandably so, it becomes important to monitor the outcome of all these efforts in 
terms of results produced by action taken and money invested to fight financial crime. 
This is a study about the monitoring of outcomes of the governments‘ anti-
terrorist financing effort. Outcome monitoring is defined as ―the regular (periodic, 
frequent) reporting of program results in ways that stakeholders can use to understand 
                                                 
7
. Anonymous, ―Dutch Anti-Terror Raids Net Seven,‖ November 2004. [cited on December 12, 2005]  
Available from World Wide Web: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3998347.stm). 
 
8
. Anonymous, ―London bomber called accomplices,‖ August 24, 2005. [cited on December 12, 2005]  
Available from World Wide Web: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4181454.stm). 
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and judge those results.‖9 It creates an accountability framework for programs by 
compelling managers to answer questions such as what they should measure, how many 
measures they should have, how and when to measure performance, and how to present 
performance results.
10
 Regrettably, some studies suggest that outcome monitoring instills 
fear in program managers and forces them to shy away from measuring the true impact of 
their programs. A Congressional Research Service report stated that ―the parameters used 
to measure progress can set the framework for the measurement of failure.‖11 In the 
context of the ‗war on terror‘, government has been accused of an over reliance on 
quantitative measures  such as ―those which may correlate with progress but not 
accurately measure it, such as the amount of money spent on anti-terror efforts.‖12 But 
why is outcome monitoring needed in this realm? The following section discusses this 
further. 
General Statement of Problem Area 
The problem to be examined in this study involves the high rates of financial 
crime
13
 and the possible lack of outcome measurement of public administration practices 
adopted by financial intelligence units (FIUs) to counter it. The lack of the focus on 
outcomes by government agencies, in this regard, is brought to light. 
 
                                                 
9
.  Dennis Affholter, Outcome Monitoring. Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation. (Jossey-Bass Inc., 
CA, 1994). 
 
10
. Ibid.  
 
11
.  Perl, R.  ―Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness,‖ CRS Report for Congress 
(November 23, 2005). 
 
12
. Ibid. 
 
13
. Terrorist financing and related money laundering and tax evasion. 
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Research Purpose 
The primary purpose of this research is to study organizational performance 
among FIUs and their ability to counter financial crime. The secondary purpose is to 
determine a set of performance metrics that could be adapted among FIUs globally in 
order to close the gaps in tackling financial crime.  
 
Research Problem 
There are three facets of the research problem: (1) The large-scale misuse of 
funds to commit financial crime; (2) The ease with which criminals continue to 
circumvent government controls to commit financial crime due to the lack of 
organizational effectiveness; and (3) Inter-jurisdictional differentials in organizational 
standards that compromise efficiency in solving financial crime that necessitate 
coordinating the ‗war on terror‘, both, within national boundaries and on a global scale. 
 
Significance of the Study 
The study is significant for three reasons. First, most related studies have called 
for inter-agency co-ordination to solve financial crime. This study goes further by 
examining business processes, human resources, financial principles and customer 
satisfaction tenets employed by FIUs in tackling financial crime. Second, most studies on 
this subject have been parochial in nature, that is, single-jurisdictional case studies. This 
study explores public administration practices of FIUs within different regions of the 
world: the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and North America. It is, in this sense, unique to 
the field. Third, the recommendations at the conclusion of this study will spur agencies 
 6 
the world over to consider for adoption as a means of a more effective way to counter 
financial crime. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Soon after the attacks of September 11, 2001, one question lingered in people‘s 
minds: ―[Would] federal interagency competition and conflicts, combined with 
differences in organizational cultures and missions, would confound the homeland 
security initiative [?]‖14  There were a number of organizational management models 
suggested to enhance the coordination of this initiative. For example, Waugh and Sylves 
(2002) called for the use of network management to co-ordinate the number of actors 
involved, not only for this but other major governmental programs and policy initiatives. 
Under network management, coordination can be improved and goals met through a sort 
of regulatory or contractual structure or partnership where goals are listed, each agency‘s 
role in achieving them defined and target requirements outlined. In short, a system of 
performance management throughout the network must exist.
15
 
The same principle applies to financial crime. There are a number of parts of the 
financial-crime fighting network: financial and other entities that report suspicious 
transactions, the FIU that processes, analyzes and disseminates this information, 
intelligence agencies and law enforcement that charge criminals with the help of 
information disseminated to them, prosecutors who attempt to prove charges against 
these criminals and those responsible for convicting them. The coordination of the 
                                                 
14
.  William Lee Waugh et al., ―Organizing the War on Terrorism,‖ Public Administration Review, Special 
Issue (September 2002): 145-153. 
 
15
.  Waugh et al., 148.  
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activities of all of these entities in the network calls for effective performance 
management (PM) which leads to accountability. 
Following in the footsteps of private enterprises, many governments around the 
world are in the process of finding ways to measure and new means of evaluating 
performance within their jurisdictions. This is a result of a public administration reform 
movement called New Public Management (NPM) which was first introduced in 
Australia and New Zealand and subsequently adopted by the OECD. An example of 
NPM is Australia‘s PM system or as it is locally known, Outcomes and Outputs 
Framework (1997), which is structured down-up on the basis of:  
i) what government wants to achieve, that is, outcomes;  
ii) how government achieves this, that is, outputs and administered items 
produced;  
iii) how government knows it is succeeding, that is, what it is held 
accountable for.
16
  
 
Other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, have adopted similar PM 
systems. And it seems to be working. Over the last couple of decades, there have been 
instances of PM, via targeting setting and performance measurement, enhancing 
accountability through improved practices and processes within the public sector. 
Among its many roots, measuring performance essentially stems from the need to 
‗do more with less‘, that is, how governments maximize value for each taxpayer‘s dollar.  
In today‘s global society, this demand is partly placed on government by a more educated 
                                                 
16.  Australian Department of Finance and Administration, ―The Outcomes & Outputs Framework 
Guidance Document,‖ (November 2000): 3-4. 
 8 
citizenry who place the burden of achieving value-for-money on politicians and 
bureaucrats. On the other hand, legislators‘ limited terms in office places responsibility 
on them to achieve results within their tenure in government. Spurred by the motive to 
‗reinvent government,‘ much of the public sector around the world has caught on to this 
concept of measuring and managing performance. The reach of PM can be considered 
bimodal with many government agencies still to participate in the complete 
implementation and utilization of PM practices. Nevertheless, the scale of benchmarking 
and cross-jurisdictional comparisons has increased among practitioners with the adoption 
of advanced PM systems such as ActiveStrategy and Enterprise Resource Planning. In 
fact, research has stamped the utility of performance measurement in determining 
investment levels for program initiatives.
17
 As a result of its strategic importance, 
performance management has been increasingly used in many important government 
initiatives, the countering of financial crime being one of them. 
Next is a discussion of PM within the context of governmental re-organization in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks cited at the beginning of this chapter. The global 
‗war on terror‘ has resulted in new fiscal pressures on government. Program and policy 
initiatives as a result of the recent terrorist attacks have cut across different levels of 
government, sectors, and national boundaries. Among the various security measures 
initiated and upgraded by government, the role and performance of intelligence agencies 
has been brought to the forefront. In recommending an appropriate PM system for these 
agencies in the U.S., a recently published Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) report 
                                                 
17
.  Howard A. Frank and D‘Souza, Jayesh, ―Twelve Years into the Performance Measurement Revolution: 
Where We Need to Go in Implementation Research.‖ International Journal of Public Administration 
27:8&9 (July/August 2004): 701-718.   
 
 9 
cited the central theme of the 9/11 Commission report that ―one of the major challenges 
facing the intelligence community is moving from a culture of a ‗need to know‘ to a 
‗need to share‘.‖18 This culture can be percolated through an organization with the help of 
strong leadership which can use PM to tie strategy and implementation to outcomes. This 
has been a forgotten practice in the ‗war on terror.‘  
By connecting implementation to strategy, an agency can become more results-
oriented, customer-focused and collaborative with agencies performing overlapping 
functions. The ideal end result is streamlined operations through the elimination of 
redundancy, reduced costs and a happier workforce and customer.
19
 All these, in some 
way, shape, or form, constitute the core of the framework of this study, the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSC), which is discussed in detail in the methodology section of this 
dissertation. One of the underlying assumptions of this study is that the BSC can assist 
decision-makers in assessing outcomes in prosecuting ‗the war on terror‘.   
The thrust of a sound PM system is its metrics because metrics help an 
organization monitor its progress towards strategic aims. Stated simply, agencies need to 
ask, ―What must we measure?‖  It is important for an agency to get this right because 
knowing what it must measure ―can help send unmistakable messages about the behavior 
that the organization values and that support the organization‘s mission and goals, as well 
as provide a consistent message to employees about how they are expected to achieve 
results. Thus, as transformation efforts are implemented, individual performance and 
                                                 
18.  United States General Accounting Office, ―Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical 
to 9/11 Commission's Proposed Reforms,‖ GAO-04-1084T (September 14, 2004):7. 
 
19
.  Ibid, 2. 
 
 10 
contributions [should be] evaluated on competencies such as change management, 
cultural sensitivity, teamwork, collaboration, and information sharing. Leaders, 
managers, and employees who demonstrate these competencies [should be] rewarded for 
their successful contributions to the achievement of the transformation process.‖20 This 
would replace the bureaucratic lock-step compensation process currently in place.  
The establishment of an effective PM system is a matter of trial and error. The 
difficulty is in designing PM systems and proof of this is reflected in the experience of 
certain U.S. government agencies. James Carroll (2003) wrote, ―Perhaps the greatest 
challenge is establishing a conceptual and institutional capacity to formulate a strategic 
vision of the roles and missions of government, how these relate to each other, and how 
these can be pursued. A provision of the Government Performance and Results Act, in 
effect, requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a government-
wide performance plan.  OMB has interpreted this provision narrowly.‖21  
 
Research Questions 
In accordance with the framework of this study, this research attempts to support 
the following hypothesis by answering the questions referenced below: 
 Main Question 
The success in countering financial crime is impacted by the focus, measurement and 
monitoring of outcomes by governmental financial-crime fighting agencies. Can the 
Balanced Scorecard assist in determining this? 
                                                 
20
.  Ibid, 8.   
 
21.  James D. Carroll, ―The Domestic Security State,‖ Government Foresight (September 2003): 22. 
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Additional Questions 
1) What are the drivers and impediments in countering financial crime? 
2) What are the outcome measures that will help further reduce the incidence of financial 
crime? 
3) Do American and foreign FIUs need to focus on different outcomes?  
4) Is there a consensus on performance metrics that measure the performance outcomes 
of FIUs? 
Responses to these questions form the core of this study and provide evidence to support 
or reject the hypotheses. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter concludes with a summary of what drives a public agency towards 
becoming a high-performing organization in the realm of performance management.  A 
forum conducted by the GAO involving practitioner and academic participants revealed 
that in order to sustain high performance, organizations need to constantly take stock of 
their own performance and evaluate it in relation to that of other organizations. It is also 
important for organizations to create the right culture for managing and guiding their 
performance. Driven by a commitment from management, organizations must train their 
employees in the intricacies of their PM systems so that these systems run smoothly. In 
the context of fighting terrorism, governments must move beyond merely ‗throwing 
money at the problem‘ to concrete performance-enhancement measures by setting 
performance targets and metrics to achieve them. This was best described at a sub-
committee hearing at the U.S. House of Representatives, ―Without establishing minimal 
 12 
preparedness levels and equipment and performance standards that the Federal 
Government and State and local communities can strive to attain, the United States will 
have created an illusion of preparedness based on boutique funding initiatives without 
being systematically prepared.‖22  
In conclusion, the objective of this study is to help government agencies find 
more effective organizational practices, using the Balanced Scorecard, to counter 
financial crime. This is done by utilizing a unique set of data that questions how 
governments can use performance management to monitor progress towards countering 
financial crime.  In order to apply PM to a government initiative, it is important to first 
define the problem. Chapter II explores the depth and breadth of the problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22.  Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, ―Combating Terrorism: Preparing and Funding 
First Responders.‖ Emerging Threats and International Relations, One Hundred Eighth Congress, 
September 9, 2003, page 2.  
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CHAPTER II 
FINANCIAL CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
Given the expansive nature of financial crime, the global network of financial 
criminals, and the necessity of international cooperation to counter it among a variety of 
players in the field, it is necessary to properly understand the very nature of the problem.  
Chapter 2 explains how terrorist financing, and related money laundering and tax evasion 
constitute financial criminality. It also introduces the reader to the working of FIUs.  
Terrorist Financing 
Terrorist financing is the lifeline of terrorism.  In simplistic terms, it is ―the act of 
knowingly providing something of value to persons and groups engaged in terrorist 
activity‖23 and is a global problem. The OECD Observer reports that European and 
American authorities have found a number of methods used by terrorists to raise funds 
for their activities such as forming front companies, channeling funds through 
delicatessens and unlicensed remittance schemes.
24
 Terrorist financing is further defined 
by the source of funds and the mode of transfer of funds both of which are discussed 
next. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
.  Jeff Breinholt, "Reaching the White Collar Terrorist: Operational Challenges," IMF Seminar Program 
(September 2004): 3. 
 
24.  OECD Observer, ―Dirty Money: The Financial War on Terrorism,‖ October, 2004. [cited on December 
12, 2005]  Available from World Wide Web: 
(http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1270/Dirty_money.html). 
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Sources of Funds 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
25
 has identified the major sources of 
terrorist funding as drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping, robbery, fraud, gambling, 
smuggling and trafficking in counterfeit goods, direct sponsorship by certain countries, 
contributions and donations, sale of publications (legal and illegal) and funds derived 
from legitimate businesses.
26
 The more prominent of these in the context of the ‗war on 
terror‘ are discussed below: 
State Sponsors – According to a U.S. Department of State release in April 2001, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan were designated state sponsors of 
international terrorism by the U.S. Secretary of State.
27
 A later update (2004) suggested 
that while Libya and Sudan were co-operating in the global war on terrorism and the 
terrorist-supporting regime in Iraq had been expelled from power, the rest of the countries 
were still associated with state-sponsored terrorism.
28
  
 
Individual/Corporate Contributors – The stand-out among individual contributors of 
terrorist funding is Osama bin Laden. According to U.S. prosecutors, bin Laden is not 
                                                 
25. ―A constituency of thirty-one countries and territories, and two regional organizations, the FATF is an 
inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international 
policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.  The FATF is therefore a ‗policy-making 
body‘ created in 1989 that works to generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and 
regulatory reforms in these areas.‖ FATF, 2005 (www.fatf-gafi.org/). 
 
26
. Anonymous. "The law in context; Sub-group 2: Impact of the initiatives against terrorist property on 
banks and financial institutions."  Journal of Money Laundering Control 6  (2003): 233. 
 
27. U.S. Department of State, ―Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2000,‖ April 30, 2001. [cited on August 25, 
2005]  Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm). 
 
28. U.S. Department of State, ―Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2003,‖ April 29, 2004. [cited on August 25, 
2005]  Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31644.htm). 
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only the mastermind behind a number of strikes on U.S. targets but also used an 
estimated $250 million in personal wealth to fund his causes.
29
 His personal businesses 
including a bakery, a furniture company, and a cattle-breeding operation were used to 
funnel money for the purpose of financing and committing terrorist acts.
30
   
 
Non-profit Organizations – According to Interpol, a non-profit organization that supports 
a terrorist‘s cause could support the terrorist‘s activity through a charitable donation to 
the concerned terrorist. Since these funds are cash-based, it is difficult to verify either the 
origin or final destination of the funds.
31
 December 2001 marked one of the first times 
since 9/11 when the U.S. Treasury Department took action against the charitable 
organizations, Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation for 
suspected providing funds in support of terrorist activity.
32
 In mid-2004, the Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development was indicted by a federal grand jury in Dallas for 
providing more than $12.4 million in support of the Palestinian terrorist group, Hamas.
33
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Government Programs – The oil-for-food program in Iraq was a humanitarian program 
introduced by the U.N. Security Council to help Iraqis cope with the consequences of the 
sanctions imposed after the 1991 Gulf War.
34
 According to the program, Iraq could sell a 
limited amount of crude oil and use the proceeds to purchase essentials such as food and 
medicine. Also, Iraq could determine to whom to sell oil and from whom to buy 
essentials. However, Iraq dictator, Saddam Hussein, cheated the program of billions of 
dollars by engaging in operations outside the scheme and accepting kickbacks for these.
35
 
Furthermore, an opinion published in the Wall Street Journal suggested that some of this 
money may have been used to finance terrorism: ―In a world beset right now by terrorist 
threats -- which depend on terrorist financing -- it's time to acknowledge that the U.N.'s 
Oil- for-Food program was worse than simply a case of grand larceny. Given Saddam's 
proclivities for deceit and violence, Oil-for-Food was also a menace to security.‖36 
 
Illegal Sources – Sources of funding for terrorist activity through illegal means can take 
the form of any one or a combination of kidnappings, extortion and ‗revolutionary taxes‘ 
or, protection money. A good example is the financing of terrorist activity in Colombia 
using ransom money through kidnappings and extortions. Some of these criminals also 
force people to grow coca and charge them a ‗tax‘ on the proceeds.37 Commodities such 
                                                 
34
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as contraband cigarettes, counterfeit goods, and illicit drugs and liquor are also used by 
terrorist groups to raise funds. An example of this is how Islamic resistance group, 
Hezbollah raised funds for its activities from profits derived by buying cigarettes at a 
lower price in lower tax states and selling them in other states at higher prices.
38
 
  
Some interesting issues arise with respect to the sources of terrorist financing. 
Firstly, the FATF questions whether distinguishing between legal and illegal sources of 
funding has an effect on the ability of countries to use anti-money laundering measures to 
detect, investigate and prosecute potential terrorist-related money laundering.
39
  
Secondly, the FATF notes that raising funds for terrorism through state sponsorship has 
declined resulting in an increase in organized crime for this purpose.
40
 
 
Modes of Transfer of Funds 
Funds used to finance terrorist activity are essentially moved through the banking 
system (and savings and investment houses such as brokerage houses, insurance 
companies, mutual funds and other investment companies that operate along similar 
lines) and what are known as, alternative modes such as the informal value-transfer 
system.  Each of these is discussed next. 
                                                 
38
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Formal Banking System - The most common mode of transfer of terrorist finances is 
through the banking system. Terrorist financiers use banks to open and transfer funds 
through: legitimate accounts which is regular bank account used to facilitate cash 
transactions, dormant accounts which are only used when circumstances demand, 
telegraphic transfer that are used to wire funds from one destination to another and 
money service businesses that channel funds between parties.
41
 While it is difficult to 
estimate the amount of money moved through the banking system to finance terrorism, 
evidence suggests the need to strengthen regulatory and procedural guidelines to deal 
with the problem. 
Financial Sector Initiatives 
In view of the above, both the public and private sectors have attempted to 
enforce measures that will result in banks being more vigilant in detecting and reporting 
suspicious activity. The thrust for banking reform to counter the financing of terrorism 
has come from three main entities: i) the Basel Committee; ii) the Wolfsberg Group; and 
iii) individual government efforts. Established in 1974, the Basel Committee is a group of 
representatives from central banks and banking authorities from ten countries: Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The task of this Committee is to create 
standards and guidelines, and a set of best practices for member nations to establish in 
their respective jurisdictions.
42
 In the context of counter terrorist financing, the 
                                                 
41
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Committee issued Customer Due Diligence For Banks in October 2001 which was 
reinforced, in 2003, by a General Guide that outlined the following elements: 
 customer acceptance policy; 
 customer identification; 
 on-going monitoring of higher risk accounts; and 
 risk management.43 
The private sector has been no less active through the efforts of the Wolfsberg 
Group which comprises 12 prominent banks around the world, namely, ABN Amro Bank 
N.V. (the Netherlands), Santander Central Hispano, S.A. (Spain), Bank of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi, Ltd. (Japan), Barclays (United Kingdom), Citigroup (United States), Credit 
Suisse Group (Switzerland), Deutsche Bank AG (Germany), Goldman Sachs (United 
States), HSBC (China), J.P. Morgan Chase (United States), Societe Generale (France), 
UBS AG (Switzerland). In 2000, this group released a set of compliance norms known as 
the Wolfsberg Principles that engage banks in identifying account holders‘ true identity, 
the sources of their funds and monitoring accounts for suspicious transactions or 
patterns.
44
 
The philosophy behind the Wolfsberg Principles is encompassed in legislation in 
the many countries involved in the anti-terrorism fight. The Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) in the United Kingdom published a consultation paper Reviewing the FSA 
Handbook right after the London bombings that was expected to take the fight against 
                                                 
43. Bank For International Settlements, ―Consolidated KYC Risk Management,‖ [cited on August 27, 2005] 
Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs110.htm).  
 
44
. Anonymous. "Anti-Laundering Plan Criticized."  American Banker 166 (January 10, 2001): 4. 
 
 20 
terrorist financing and money laundering to a higher level.
45
 In Consultation Paper 142 
Operational Risk Systems and Controls published in July 2002, the FSA establishes a 
framework for risk management and compliance for financial services.
46
  
In the United States, Sections 314 and 326 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (which 
fortifies the Bank Secrecy Act) lay down specific requirements for banks. Section 314 
calls for banks to inspect their client records for suspected terrorists and money 
launderers forwarded to them by law enforcement agencies. Section 326 requires banks 
to obtain enhanced client identification for the purpose of identity verification, as part of 
the new ‗know your customer‘ policy.47 Australia passed similar legislation in the form of 
Resolution 1373 in September 2001 and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
Act of 2002.
48
  
There are cases where government initiatives that work in some countries may not 
work as effectively in others. Australia and Canada are seen as having efficient systems 
for collecting information from wire transfers of funds. It should be noted here that this 
was the mode of transfer used by the 9/11 hijackers who wired more than $130,000 in 
funds.
49
 However, because of the sheer volume of international transfers in the United 
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States and the limited resources available to the U.S. government, the viability of having 
a system in the U.S. similar to those of Australia and Canada has been under a lengthy 
process of study.
50
 
The challenge that lies ahead is getting banks to follow set guidelines and comply 
with these principles. The most notorious case of non-compliance has been Riggs Bank 
whose lack of compliance with anti-money laundering regulations resulted in it paying 
millions of dollars in penalties.
51
 
 
Alternative Financing Mechanisms – A 2003 GAO report U.S. Agencies Should 
Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms cites a 
number of modes of transfer of funds that terrorists use to finance their activities 
including the illicit drug trade, the misuse of charities and the currency trade.
52
  However, 
the most common method that falls in this category is the informal banking system also 
known as hawala or hundi. All of these methods are described next. 
Informal Banking System  
The most common type of informal banking system is known as hawala or hundi. 
It is a legitimate remittance system that serves as an alternative to the banking one. It is 
based more on the use of connections in the form of family ties or acquaintances and 
transactions often take place based on trust rather than the use of a negotiable instrument. 
It is conducted through a series of steps described in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1: Steps Involved In a Typical Hawala Transaction 
 
Source: GAO-04-63: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use  
of Alternative Financing Mechanisms 
 
The advantage of using hawalas over traditional methods to transfer funds is that the 
former is less costly (compared to bank charges for changing currency) and more 
efficient (than sending a bank draft or sending money through an international wire 
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transfer).
53
 The disadvantage is that they are often used to transfer funds for illegal 
activities such as terrorism. 
 
Charity  
The crackdown on the funding of terrorist activity after September 11, 2001 has 
led to the U.S. and foreign governments identifying charities, both, inside and outside the 
United States, as vehicles for the movement of terrorists‘ funds.54 On February 12, 2003, 
the U.S. Department of Justice indicted University of Idaho student, Sami Omar Al-
Hussayen, who fronted a Michigan-based charity, the Islamic Assembly of North 
America (IANA). The purpose of this charity was to spread the word of Islam through 
media such as the Internet which contained messages to accumulate financial and human 
resources for terrorist activity against the United States.
55
 The Department of Justice 
found that non-student aid funds of approximately $100,000 that flowed to Al-
Hussayen‘s bank accounts from overseas sources were remitted to IANA and people 
connected to it. The charges brought against Al-Hussayen were visa fraud and offences 
for making false statements.  
Charities have also come under scrutiny in the U.K. In May, 2006, the offices of 
Sanabel Relief Agency were raided and its assets frozen. Sanabel was accused by the 
                                                 
53.  Interpol General Secretariat, ―The Hawala alternative remittance system and its role in money 
laundering,‖ [cited on December 29, 2008] Available from World Wide Web: 
(http://www.interpol.int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/Hawala/default.asp). 
 
54. Francis, David. "The war on terror money: Will nations' efforts to cut off terrorists' financing stop future 
attacks?"  The Christian Science Monitor (April 8, 2004): 14. 
 
55
. United States Department of Justice, ―Terrorist Financing,‖ 51:4 (July 2003): 19. 
 
 24 
U.S. government of being a front for Al-Qaeda and channeling money to a terrorist group 
responsible for making an attempt on the life of Libya‘s head, Muammar Gadafy.56 
 
Commodities   
In relation to funds moved through commodities, the GAO study on alternate 
terrorism financing mechanisms uncovered that ―to carry assets across borders without 
detection, terrorists seek to smuggle bulk cash or convert their assets into commodities 
that are relatively liquid and easy to conceal. Terrorists can also convert their assets into 
internationally traded commodities that serve as forms of currency, such as gold, but are 
not subject to standard financial reporting requirements. Commodities that can be 
smuggled owing to their ease of concealment are particularly attractive.‖57 Other 
commodities, besides gold, include illicit drugs, weapons, cigarettes and precious stones. 
Another commodity is honey. Reports suggest that members of the terrorist group, Al-
Qaeda, started moving funds through commodities instead of banks when the U.S. 
government froze $220 million worth of gold deposited in the Federal Reserve system by 
Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives post-911.
58
 On record is the fact that Osama bin Laden 
used a network of honey stores for the purpose of raising money and smuggling 
contraband.
59
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A combination of the simplicity of raising funds and complexity in the methods of 
transferring them has led experts to claim that it is more difficult to track funds used by 
terrorists than by other criminals because of the low cost of carrying out terrorist acts and 
the general practice of using legitimate source to fund terrorism.
60
 According to the 9/11 
Commission Report, the U.S. government has still been unable to trace the source of 
funds used to finance the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  It also claims that the 
funding for the attacks, estimated at $30 million by the CIA, was raised almost entirely 
through personal donations.
61
 In contrast to money laundering, terrorism is financed 
through small sums of money which make it hard to track especially when raised from 
legitimate sources.
62
 Besides this, there are reports that dispute the effectiveness of the 
new banking laws.  One report states that ―under the [pre 9/11] Bank Secrecy Act, about 
85 per cent of banks engage in some sort of customer profiling, filing Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SAR) with agencies like the FBI, the Secret Service, and the Customs Service. 
All US attorneys and 59 law-enforcement agencies can search the SAR database without 
probable cause. Yet none of them saw the $100,000 received by Mohamed Atta weeks 
before 11th September, even though that transaction was in the database and Atta's name 
was on the FBI's list of ‗most wanted‘ terrorists.‖63  
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The scale of misuse of funds for financing terrorism calls for the need to invest in 
sufficient crime-fighting resources and broad-scale co-operation among law enforcement 
agencies, both, domestically and internationally.
64
 Just as it is difficult to trace funds raised 
through terrorist financing, it is as hard to trace funds raised through money laundering. 
This is another method through which terrorists raise money to support their activities and a 
discourse on it follows. 
 
Money Laundering 
Defined generally, money laundering is ―the process of concealing the existence, 
illegal source, or application of income derived from criminal activity, and the 
subsequent disguising of the source of that income to make it appear legitimate.‖65  Such 
criminal activity includes illegal arms sales, smuggling, drug trafficking, prostitution 
rings, embezzlement, insider trading, bribery, and computer fraud schemes. Much like 
terrorist financing, money laundering not only affects the integrity of business and 
financial services but also the economic development of countries where it occurs.
66
 It 
adversely influences public confidence in banks and financial markets especially in 
emerging economies.
67
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Due to the similarities between terrorist financing and money laundering, 
government agencies adopt similar strategies in countering money laundering and 
terrorist financing. But there are also differences between these two crimes. While money 
launderers work with ‗dirty money,‘ this is not necessarily true for terrorists who 
sometimes use money earned through legal means for their activities; these amounts are, 
generally, smaller than laundered funds. Whereas, in terrorist financing, the act is 
committed after money has been moved to the entities committing the act, in the case of 
money laundering, criminal activity takes place prior to funds being laundered. In other 
words, ―money laundering cleans dirty money; terrorist financing dirties clean money.‖68 
Money laundering is generally carried out in three steps. The first step in the 
money laundering process is placement.  This is when ‗dirty money‘ first enters the 
financial system, for example, when drugs are sold illegally for cash and then deposited 
at a financial institution.
69
 Another example is using this ‗dirty money‘ to purchase 
money orders.
70
  The next step is layering, which perhaps represents the most complex 
stage of the process. Here the launderer, though a series of financial transactions, 
attempts to conceal the original source of the funds.
71
 This may involve transferring the 
‗dirty money‘ from one bank to many banks after breaking it down into smaller 
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amounts.
72
 This is followed by the last step, integration, which occurs when the illicit 
funds are assimilated with the commercial economy through legal commercial 
transactions. Together, these constitute money laundering, one of the most notorious 
forms of criminal activity which provides a means for criminals such as drug dealers, 
terrorist organizations, arms dealers and other criminals to make illegally earned funds 
appears legitimate.
73
   
There are as many as 176 ‗specified unlawful activities‘ that constitute money 
laundering in the United States.
74
 A list of these is shown in Appendix 1. An example of 
terrorism-related money laundering is the case of Haji Subandi, and Indonesian who 
conspired to sell arms to the terrorist organization, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(Tamil Tigers) in exchange for money deposited in an undercover bank account in 
Maryland. A report described this as follows, ―This transfer was a down payment for the 
arms, and the conduct is reflected in the money laundering charge contained in count 
three of the superseding indictment. An additional $452,000 payment was transferred on 
Sept. 28, 2006 for the arms.‖75 
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Of lesser significance than money laundering and terrorist financing, financial 
crime involving tax evasion has also become a part of the agenda of anti-terrorist 
financing agencies. The specifics of this form of financial crime is addressed below. 
  
Tax Evasion 
Tax evasion is related to terrorist-financing under the simple assumption that 
terrorists do not pay taxes on income they use to finance their activities. Also, money 
launderers are involved in tax evasion schemes as they often attempt to make laundered 
funds appear to stem from non-taxable sources. Government initiatives to counter tax 
evasion in the context of terrorist financing and money laundering are wide-spread. For 
example, in the United States, the IRS has a Criminal Investigation Unit (IRS-CI) and a 
Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division that oversee different aspects of this 
financial crime in order to encourage tax compliance; the former deals with investigative 
issues while the latter enforces compliance with regard to the registration, reporting and 
record-keeping.
76
 The IRS-CI is a recipient of $3 million in funding, annually, to staff its 
task forces in HIFCAs.
77
 Also under the IRS‘ jurisdiction is ensuring compliance in 
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relation to the maintenance of off-shore accounts through the Report of Foreign Bank and 
Financial Accounts (FBARs).
78
    
FIUs with the responsibility of exposing money launderers and financiers of 
terrorism have also been entrusted with tracking down tax evaders and have had success 
in doing so. An Australian government audit report released in the year 2000 discloses, 
―Over the last five financial years, $160 million (Australian) has been raised in 
assessments for additional tax and penalties that can be directly attributed either wholly, 
or in part, to the use of AUSTRAC data. Although the use of AUSTRAC data does not 
contribute significantly to the Australian Tax Office‘s (ATO) overall revenue collection 
($47 million Australian in 1998–99), it does make a valuable contribution to tax 
administration. It is an important intelligence source that aids compliance activities. 
There are also indirect benefits associated with using AUSTRAC data. The level of 
voluntary compliance, which flows from ATO audit activity and community and industry 
awareness of the ATO/AUSTRAC relationship, assist in deterring potential tax 
evaders.‖79  
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On the international front, funds channeled through tax havens
80
 for possible 
financing of terror-related activities has received special attention from the OECD. While 
it does not have the authority to enforce its principles on countries, it publishes a list of 
Uncooperative Tax Havens. By choosing to cooperate, countries commit to transparency 
of operations and the exchange of information which will result in a more coordinated 
effort to counter financial crime.
81
 Included in this list of tax havens are offshore 
financial centers (OFCs)
82
. Also active in this regard is the International Monetary Front 
(IMF). The IMF oversees the OFC assessment program
83
 that assesses the compliance by 
OFCs to international standards against financial crime.
84
  
There are other instances where anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-
terrorist financing (CTF) initiatives have also been charted multilaterally.
85
 The United 
Nations and the FATF have been among the chief initiators and coordinators of these 
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efforts. The United Nations was responsible for the first international treaty that proposed 
the criminalization of money laundering through the adoption of the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 
1988. Key among the U.N.‘s programs is the Global Program Against Money Laundering 
run by its Office on Drugs and Crime and administered for the purpose of providing 
member nations assistance in developing the tools to combat money laundering.
86
  
Similarly, the FATF has adopted a counteractive stance against money laundering 
and terrorist financing through the publication of a written supplement famously known 
as the Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering. The Forty Recommendations are a 
set of drafted guidelines for governments and financial institutions of practical measures 
to counter financial crime
87
 The FATF conducts a periodic evaluation of nations‘ 
effectiveness in implementing its standards known as ‗mutual evaluations‘. It is currently 
on its third round of evaluations.
88
 In June 2000, FATF announced a ‗name and shame‘ 
policy whereby countries that did not comply with international standards and improve 
their weak anti-money laundering regimes would be disclosed by the FATF. They would 
face the possibility of counter-measures that included would restrict or ban transactions 
with such territories.
89
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While on the international front, these efforts are supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank through assessments, technical assistance and 
policy development guidance
90
, they are also bolstered regionally by AML and CTF 
measures imposed by regional bodies like the European Union and regional development 
banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Asian Development Bank (ABD).
91
 At the 
center of these initiatives, is the FIU.  
The roles of the FIUs and the length of time they‘ve been in existence vary by 
country. The United States‘ Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) came into 
existence in April 1990
92
 while the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
of Canada (FINTRAC) is relatively new, having been established in July 2000.
93
 The 
responsibilities of FINTRAC cover money laundering and terrorist financing detection 
while those of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), set 
up in 1988, include the deterrence of tax evasion as well.
94
 A number of FIUs transcend 
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national boundaries and work together as part of an informal group called the Egmont 
Group.
95
 Any attempt to study the performance of FIUs involved in this study must be 
pre-empted by the study of its role. What therefore follows is a conspectus of the 
organization and set-up of FIUs. 
 
Function Of Financial Intelligence Units 
FIUs differ from one another in structure and reporting authority. The FIUs in this 
study serve as a link between the entities that report to it such as financial institutions, 
and law enforcement and essentially perform the same functions. The Egmont Group 
views an FIU as a ‗central, national agency‘ that serves as a point of exchange for 
information for other FIUs within this Group and performs three core functions: 
receiving, analyzing, and disseminating financial information disclosed to it to the 
relevant authorities.
96
 Recommendation 26 of the FATF‘s 40 Recommendations 
elaborates on this, stipulating, ―Countries should establish a FIU that serves as a national 
centre for the receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and dissemination of 
suspicious transaction report (STR) and other information regarding potential money 
laundering or terrorist financing. The FIU should have access, directly or indirectly, on a 
timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it 
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requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STR.‖97 These 
functions are detailed next. 
 
Receiving Information 
FIUs receive information from reporting entities, other FIUs, and domestic 
agencies. Reporting entities vary with the means used by criminals to carry out their 
illegal activities and range from financial institutions, insurance and securities companies 
and casinos to dealers in precious metal and precious stones, and to real estate agents, 
lawyers, notaries and accountants. The kind of information reported to FIUs varies with 
the jurisdiction. While in most jurisdictions, entities are required to report ‗suspicious‘ 
transactions to their FIU, in jurisdictions like the U.S., entities are required to report 
suspicious activities.
98
 A suspicious transaction report (STRs) is defined as ―a report that 
financial institutions must file to a country‘s FIU if a transaction is suspected to be linked 
to criminal activity or to terrorism.‖99 Suspicious activities are broader in scope than 
suspicious transactions and failure to file either of these with the concerned FIU can 
result in the non-compliant entity being fined, in some cases, losing its authorization to 
operate or even imprisoned.
100
 In the Netherlands, entities report ‗unusual‘ transactions101 
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which will be discussed later in the chapter. Due to the heavy volume of information 
received, and FIU must have the capacity to store and analyze information reported to 
them. This leads us to the next function of FIUs. 
 
Analyzing Information 
Once data are received from reporting entities, the FIU must analyze in order to 
distinguish unusual transactions from those that are potentially related to criminal 
activity.
102
 There are three kinds of analyses performed by FIUs: 
Tactical Analysis is looking at the data from the perspective of building a case and 
establishing the facts that render a criminal offense.
103
 In other words, the FIU attempts to 
establish a link between received information and information from its own database, 
sources available publicly, other government and non-government databases, and other 
FIUs.
104
 This is a preliminary step to future action by the FIU. 
 
Operational Analysis: Tactical analysis leads the FIU to believe that an individual, group 
of individuals, or organization has engaged in suspicious activity. FIUs undertake 
operational analysis to examine patterns of criminal activity, identify all possible 
entities/individual potentially involved and predict possible future activity.
105
 That is, the 
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FIU produces operational intelligence for law enforcement to take action on. One method 
used in this process is financial profiling which involves ―gathering, organizing, and 
presenting evidence related to the financial status of subjects. The relevance of the profile 
is to show that the target cannot demonstrate a legitimate source for the difference 
between his or her outflow of cash versus the income. The tracing of a person‘s assets 
may also provide leads linking the subject with predicate offenses.‖106 Once the FIU 
completes this process, it is in the hands of law enforcement to pursue the case further. 
 
Strategic Analysis involves documenting new issues and trends from recently completed 
cases and incorporating them into current procedures for future intelligence operations 
and analysis. For example, recent evidence might suggest the emergence of criminal 
patterns or a number of ‗suspicious‘ transactions within a particular industry or region. 
This might necessitate the FIU imposing new requirements on reporting entities or 
expanding the types of entities that report to it. This kind of analysis has broader 
AML/CTF implications (than the other two).
107
 
 
Disseminating Information 
After the FIU has received and analyzed data, it must ‗disseminate‘ or distribute it 
to the appropriate agency – domestic or international. The FIU has the responsibility of 
forwarding the results of its analysis to law enforcement, other intelligence agencies or 
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prosecution if its analysis reveals criminal activity.
108
 FIUs also share information with 
other FIUs guided by the Principles for Information Exchange (June 2001) and Best 
Practices for the Exchange of Information (November 2004).
109
 
 
Chapter Summary 
It can be argued that it would not have been possible to fund the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 if the money supply to the terrorists involved had been cut off prior 
to, and over the course, of planning these attacks.  Consequently, governments have 
deemed it imperative to focus their efforts on preventing terrorism by stopping the 
financing of terrorist activity.  In pursuit of this endeavor, most governments have 
sharpened their focus on financial intelligence and attempted to strengthen processes and 
procedures in monitoring suspicious financial transactions.  This chapter documents the 
fact that a major portion of the AML/CTF initiatives have taken place in the form of 
policy, program and legal initiatives. The focus on government in achieving its objectives 
through public administration and performance management has been minimal.  
Terrorist financing is a critical component of terrorists‘ activities. Experts believe 
that it is not possible to completely stop funds to finance terror from flowing into the 
wrong hands. It is, however, possible to interrupt this flow by instituting measures at key 
‗checkpoints‘ in the laundering and transfer process. Effectiveness in countering financial 
crime is, therefore, measured in terms of disrupting the movement of funds to terrorists at 
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the place and time they expect these funds to reach them. Experts suggest a change in the 
outlook in fighting financial crime: ―…the metrics most often used to assess efforts 
against terrorism financing – the total amount of money seized and the overall number of 
designations – are both inadequate and misleading.‖110 The focus of this study is how to 
improve success in countering financial criminals. The next chapter discusses the 
approach of the study.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Arnold M. Rose (1976) stated, ―Facts do not simply lie around waiting to be 
picked up. Facts must be carved out of the continuous web of ongoing reality, must be 
observed within a specified frame of reference, must be measured with precision, must be 
observed where they can be related to other relevant facts. All of this involves 
‗methods‘.‖111 The first step involved in ‗carving‘ out the facts was choosing a research 
design for this study: quantitative, qualitative, or both. As discussed earlier, this is a 
multiple case study of the performance management of financial intelligence units 
(FIUs). ―…A case study, basically, is a depiction either of a phase or the totality of 
relevant experience of some selected datum…the datum may in sociological study be any 
of the following, taken singly or in combination: 1) a person, 2) a group of persons such 
as a gang or family, 3) a class of persons such as professors or thieves, 4) an ecological 
unit such as a neighborhood or community, 5) a cultural unit such as a fashion or 
institution.‖ explains Paul Foreman (1976). 112 
Any case study must begin with the collection and review of past literature.  This 
study is preceded by a review of relevant literature from books, journals, newspapers, the 
Internet and other print media for the past 25 years. The purpose of this is to provide 
background material for the study. The literature review that constitutes the theoretical 
construct in this study is supported by primary data through interviewing financial 
intelligence government officials and related stakeholders. This provides in-depth 
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analyses of the organizational issues being studied from the perspective of those within 
the respective organizations. The pros are accepted with the cons and an attempt is made 
to control the potential shortcomings of case study research. Case studies offer limited 
generalization; what is relevant to one organization, for example, may not be applicable 
to another even if the nature of business of the two organizations is the same. 
This study evolves from the notion of triangulation, that is, it represents the 
integration of interviews (qualitative research), surveys (quantitative research) and 
content analysis. The following sections are a description of each of these that constitute 
the methodology of this study. 
 
Interviews 
Interviews form a key component of this study. The rationale for conducting these 
interviews is discussed in Chapter IV. In drawing up questions for the interview, the 
Balanced Scorecard was chosen as the appropriate framework. Other options were 
considered such as the traditional results management approach, the program logic 
model, risk management approach, the scenario-based planning approach, the managing 
to system standards approach, and the capabilities-based planning and assessment 
approach. These are discussed below as outlined in an article
113
 published by Sharon 
Caudle of the GAO. 
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Traditional Results Management Approach 
This approach is also known as management by objectives (MBO), the 
components of which include developing a mission statement for the organization, 
establishing a strategic plan for it, identifying its key result areas, developing indicators, 
creating performance plans for individual employees, setting performance standards, 
conducting evaluations against these standards and finally, taking corrective action, if 
necessary.
114
  
 
Program Logic Model 
This is a performance management model. It involves a series of steps tying 
inputs (factors that go into the program) to outputs (what comes out of the program) and 
then to outcomes (results or impact of the program) based on how the program is 
expected to work and taking into account external factors that might influence the 
implementation of the program.
115
  
 
Risk Management Approach 
According to GAO report, GAO-02-208T (in the context of the ‗global war on 
terror‘), risk management is ―a systematic, analytical process to consider the likelihood 
that a threat will harm an asset or individuals and to identify actions that reduce the risk 
and mitigate the consequences of an attack or event. Risk management principles 
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acknowledge that while risk generally cannot be eliminated, enhancing protection from 
known or potential threats can reduce it.‖116  
 
Scenario-Based Planning 
This approach enhances the planning process by forcing organizations to think 
about different operational scenarios it will face in the future and how they will deal with 
the outcomes. The aim of this is to eliminate uncertainty.
117
 There are a number of steps 
involved in developing scenarios. The first of these is to identify a decision, list factors 
that could affect the outcome of the decision, rank them in order of effectiveness, draw 
out scenarios based on these rankings that could affect how decisions are made and 
analyze how these scenarios should affect decisions.
118
 
 
Managing to System Standards 
This approach involves an organization assessing its performance against that of 
other similar ones or against a government-established standard such as the ISO 9000, the 
quality management standard.
119
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Capabilities-Based Planning and Assessment Approach 
Policy think-tank RAND describes capabilities-based planning (CPB) as planning 
taking into consideration an organization‘s environment (such as economic) and other 
challenges to which it is exposed.
120
  
 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
One method commonly used in government adopted from the private sector is the 
balanced scorecard. The BSC was developed by Robert Kaplan and David Norton. It 
does not focus only on an organization‘s finances but serves as a means for an 
organization to carry out its strategy more effectively. The BSC examines an organization 
from four perspectives and uses metrics to document the organization‘s performance 
along the line of these perspectives.
121
 The first of these is the learning and growth 
perspective that deals with human resource development issues such as training and other 
employee advancement issues. The second is business process perspective which pertains 
to operational issues like the smooth flow of work processes. The third perspective is 
about the customer and customer satisfaction. The final perspective is financial which 
includes financial data and investment decisions based on cost-benefit and risk analysis. 
Metrics including elements from all perspectives must be developed and enforced by 
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governments in order to ‗turn strategy into action‘ and satisfy the requirements of the 
balanced scorecard.
122
 
Paul Niven who theorized on adopting the BSC to the public sector (2003) states, 
―Strategy remains at the core of the Scorecard system, regardless of whether it‘s a local 
theater company, city government, Fortune 500 company or a mom and pop store.‖123 
However, there are differences in applying the BSC to the private and public sectors, 
both, from an overall perspective and for each of the BSC perspectives. For starters, the 
missions of public sector organizations are easily discernible from their private sector 
counterparts and shape the four perspectives that constitute the framework. In this regard, 
Niven advises public sector managers, ―While you are accountable for the efficient 
allocation of funds that is not your ultimate aspiration. You exist to serve a higher 
purpose, for example: ‗reducing the incidence of HIV,‘ ‗bringing classical music to your 
community,‘ or ‗increasing public safety.‘‖124  
Under the precept discussed above, the customer perspective assumes prime 
importance. Customer satisfaction stems from the organization‘s mission and takes 
priority over fiscal gain.
125
 In both sectors, how well an organization is able to satisfy its 
customers is impacted upon by financial constraints.
126
 This is supplanted by employee 
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growth and development, how employees are prepared to meet the demands of customers 
within these financial restrictions.
127
 All four perspectives form a key part of the 
qualitative research section of this study. 
The BSC was selected as the framework for this study because it has become 
widely accepted. It allows for the break-down of organizations in the study based on the 
four different perspectives, the assessment of the organizations‘ strengths and weaknesses 
and the establishment of a set of performance metrics to monitor the performance of these 
organizations. This study is a preliminary effort at meeting the critical need for 
development of metrics in the fight against financial crime by deploying the BSC.  
Financial indicators are needed because this fight does not have unlimited resources and 
the domestic-international funding balance may need shifting.  A customer-orientation 
comes into play because the government must partner with banks and other private and 
public institutions in promulgating policies that are effective.  Interdicting ‗dirty‘ money 
is all about process; those prosecuting ‗the war on terror,‘ for example, must ascertain 
which processes are most effective.  And lastly, the employee learning and growth 
perspective may be, in some ways, the most critical.  As noted at the onset, financial 
criminals are wily and adaptable.  Those fighting them must adapt accordingly.  This 
study, in part, is an effort at deploying the BSC in the context of fighting financial crime 
and the interview questions were framed along these lines.
128
 However, interview 
research has its limitations which are discussed next.  
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Limitations Of Interviews 
Standardized interviews are exposed to certain biases in that the researcher 
assumes that all interviewees are equally knowledgeable about the areas covered in the 
interview. The researcher might also assume that the interviewees clearly understand the 
wording of the questions and all interviewees interpret the questions in the same way.
129
 
Dean and Whyte further elaborate on the short-comings of the standardized 
interview. The researcher must show caution against taking interviewee comments at face 
value. For example, interviewees might be under bureaucratic pressure to answer 
questions in a certain way or not disclose all the facts. The interviewee too might 
overlook certain observations or might not remember them as they happened. The 
researcher could create a distorted report for these and other reasons.
130
 By depending on 
the research group involved in this study to provide responses to the best of their abilities 
and by reporting the results of the interviewees as accurately as possible, the biases 
mentioned above were controlled.
131
 This is followed by the final step in the triangulation 
process. 
 The next task is to conduct a content analysis of primary and secondary data. By 
going through data gathered from interviews, links between the findings of the interviews 
and the literature review are identified and generalizations drawn.
132
 In order for the 
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researcher to draw inferences from generalizations made during the earlier research 
processes, it is helpful to conduct a survey. This methodology is discussed next. 
 
Surveys 
Survey research is of two types: self-administered and interviewer-administered. 
The former includes mail and electronic surveys while the latter includes telephone and 
person-to-person surveys.
133
 This study involves self-administered surveys and the use of 
these has some advantages over other quantitative methodologies. In the context of public 
administration, surveys provide a convenient way of determining whether government 
programs intended to benefit the public are perceived as doing so. They are especially 
useful when the sample is large and dispersed. Given the spread of the sampling units in 
this study, surveys seem best suited to the purpose.
134
 Another important advantage of 
surveys is ease of measurement of the results.  The researcher doesn‘t have to modify the 
questions for each respondent and ―can impute the same intent‖ to each response.135 
The target respondents for the survey were the same as those for the interviews: 
reporting entities, law enforcement, politicians and bureaucrats, and experts on the 
subject. For both the interviews and survey, all the requirements of the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) were complied with, the consent of interviewees prior to recording 
the interviews was obtained and confidentiality regarding the subject matter of the 
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interviews and (in certain cases, the identity of the interviewee) was ensured.
136
 Survey 
results were tabulated by inputting the data from the completed surveys into a statistical 
package, SPSS.  Analysis and conclusions from a slew of descriptive statistics and cross-
tabulations followed. The data analysis of primary and secondary literature was 
collectively used to test the hypothesis of the study.   
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the methodology of conducting research for this study and 
the rationale for deploying the BSC. The methodology included triangulation: a 
combination of interviews, surveys and content analysis. The purpose of the interviews is 
to sensitize differences in approaches FIUs in this study adopt in countering financial 
crime. The surveys, on the other hand, are intended to explore these differences further. 
Both the interviews and the surveys are structured along the lines of the BSC which is 
now commonly used in the field. The next two chapters present the results of, both, 
qualitative and quantitative research discussed in this chapter, first the interviews and 
then the surveys.  
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CHAPTER IV 
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED 
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS – DEPLOYING THE BALANCED 
SCORECARD 
 
Criminals are constantly finding new means to commit financial crime. The 
necessity to counter the high incidence of this crime has forced jurisdictions to sharpen 
crime-fighting modes and methods. Countries across the world have been setting up 
specialist financial intelligence units (FIUs) whose roles are to ―collect information on 
suspicious financial transaction reports that come from banks and other financial 
institutions. They also monitor large amounts of cash crossing [their respective country‘s 
borders], and support investigations into money laundering.‖137 This chapter explores the 
role and performance of FIUs through interviews with FIU officials and related entities in 
the Netherlands, the United States, Canada and Australia. It begins with a rationale for 
each of the questions that were posed in the course of the interview.  
Rationale For Interview Questions 
Interviews form an integral part of the study. The interview questions are based 
on an assessment of the organizations being studied, the four Balanced Scorecard 
components, comparison with other FIUs and specific policy issues dealing with new and 
emerging trends in financial crime. The organizations whose employees were interviewed 
for this study are listed in Appendix 2. A sample questionnaire used in the interviews can 
be found in Appendix 3. The interviews are formal or standardized, that is, the same set 
of questions were asked to interview participants from different FIUs with slight 
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modifications that were adapted to the situation of the jurisdiction of the interviewee. The 
ultimate goal here was to be able to compare responses for the purpose of benchmarking 
the performance and practices of one FIU against the other. The rationale for selection of 
the questions was as follows: 
Introductory Questions 
The purpose of these questions was to understand the overall working of the 
organizations and to gain an assessment of their performance from a broad perspective. 
1) How would you assess your FIU‘s performance in fighting financial 
crime? What has the reaction been from politicians? Citizens? People 
within the organization? 
 
2) Please discuss your FIU‘s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
(SWOT analysis).  What steps have been taken to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations post-9/11? 
 
3) How does your FIU define success? For example, would you consider it a 
success if its investigations led to 50% of financial criminals being caught 
in (the jurisdiction of study)? What are the factors that lead to success for 
your FIU? What are the impediments to success? 
 
Responses to these questions provide an overall assessment of the FIU under 
study. A report by the RAND National Security Division rightly asserted that, ―At a time 
when ‗transformation‘ is underway in defense and other areas of government, intelligence 
must keep pace or run the risk of increasing irrelevance and potential decline. And, in 
whatever form change comes, it must ultimately remain focused on the key goal of 
intelligence--outthinking and outsmarting our adversaries.‖138 The first question outlines 
this sentiment – the respondent‘s assessment of the ability of his/her home FIU to 
‗outthink and outsmart its adversaries‘ and the assessment of the FIU‘s stakeholders, 
                                                 
138. RAND Corporation, ―Toward a revolution in intelligence affairs,‖ 2005. [cited on April 11, 2006]  
Available from World Wide Web: (http://rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf). 
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namely, politicians, citizens and the FIU‘s employees, of the FIU‘s performance in doing 
so.  
 While simplistic in its orientation, SWOT analysis is an essential management 
tool to evaluate an organization‘s internal and external environment. This concept 
originated at the Stanford Research Institute with a view to finding an evaluative 
framework for corporate planning. It was the response of Fortune 500 companies to the 
opinion that long-range planning, up to 1960, was ineffective and costing companies too 
much.
139
 
In relation to countering terrorism, a US Congressional Research Service report 
highlights the importance of defining success, ―How one perceives and measures 
progress is central to formulating and implementing anti-terror strategy. The perception of 
progress has a major impact on establishing priorities and allocating resources. The 
parameters used to measure progress can also set the framework for measurement of 
failures. To better define the parameters of success, it is important to determine what both 
the terrorists, and those who fight them, see as their goals and priorities.‖140 Besides this, 
each respondent was asked about his/her perception of success and barriers to achieving 
it to probe cultural differences between jurisdictions and find out if these differences, if 
any, have an influence on the performance of FIUs in tackling financial crime. 
 
 
                                                 
139
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Questions Based on the Balanced Scorecard Approaches 
 This set of questions is intended to get a detailed perspective of the organization‘s 
functions and an evaluation of specific areas of performance. 
4) Business Process Perspective: How is your FIU set up to ensure it performs to 
maximum potential? How do you know it is doing a good job? How would you 
assess the processes and procedures followed by your FIU? What measures of 
performance do you think it should use to improve business processes? 
 
5) Customer Satisfaction Perspective: Who does your FIU see as its customers? How 
does it measure customer satisfaction and dissatisfaction? What measures of 
performance do you think it should use to improve customer satisfaction? 
 
6) Human Resource Perspective: How does your FIU assess its staffing needs and 
how does it train people to meet these needs? What kind of performance appraisal 
system does it have in place? How does your FIU tie staffing to strategic 
aims/goals? How would you assess the performance of the staff at your FIU? 
What measures of performance do you think your FIU should use for staff? 
 
7) Financial Perspective: Is your FIU producing expected return on investment? 
Which area or programs in financial crime is investment needed in? Which areas 
of your FIU could benefit from increased funding?  What measures do you use to 
determine financial performance? How do you suggest your FIU measure 
financial performance?  
 
These questions form the crux of the interviews and are based on the Balanced 
Scorecard. The BSC is a model for organizational performance revolving around key 
performance indicators in four areas, financial, customer, internal processes, and 
employee learning and growth.  Indicators in these four areas are in turn embedded in 
strategies keyed to mission. The BSC is deployed here as a mechanism for assisting 
decision-makers and analytics in improving financial crime policy, but may also prove 
useful in other facets of the ‗war on terror‘.141 
 
                                                 
141. Paper presented by Dr. Howard Frank and Jayesh D‘Souza at the Annual Conference of the Association 
for Budgeting and Financial Management, Washington D.C., November 2005. 
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General Questions 
 
 These questions are meant to cover those areas that the interviewee‘s responses  
 
might not have covered previously. This ensures the comprehensiveness of the interview. 
 
Do you have any suggestions for your FIU to improve:   
a) implementation 
b) information-sharing or  
c) strengthening its planning process, both short- and long-term? 
  
Lack of coordination, information-sharing and planning have been common complaints 
against agencies involved in fighting financial crime, both, in the United States and 
abroad. The table below shows the number of agencies with responsibility for preventing 
terrorist financing that gives an example of the fragmented approach to solving the 
problem. 
Table 4-1: Key U.S. Government Entities Responsible for Deterring Terrorist 
Financing 
 
Department Bureau/Division/Office Role 
Central Intelligence 
Agency 
 
 Leads gathering, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence on foreign 
terrorist organizations and their financing 
mechanisms; charged with promoting 
coordination and information-sharing 
between all intelligence community 
agencies. 
Homeland Security 
 
Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection 
 
Detects movement of bulk cash across U.S. 
borders and maintains data about movement 
of commodities into and out of the United 
States. 
 Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement 
(ICE - formerly part of the 
Treasury‘s U.S. Customs 
Service) 
Participates in investigations of terrorist 
financing cases involving U.S. border 
activities and the movement of trade, 
currency, or commodities. 
 U.S. Secret Service 
 
Participates in investigations of terrorist 
financing cases, including those involving 
counterfeiting. 
Justice 
 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and 
Explosives (ATF) 
Participates in investigations of terrorist 
financing cases involving alcohol, tobacco, 
firearms, and explosives. 
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 Civil Division Defends challenges to terrorist designations. 
 Criminal Division 
 
Develops, coordinates, and prosecutes 
terrorist financing cases; participates in 
financial analysis and develops relevant 
financial tools; promotes international 
efforts and delivers training to other nations. 
 Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) 
Participates in investigations of terrorist 
financing cases involving narcotics and 
other illicit drugs. 
 Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) 
Leads all terrorist financing investigations 
and operations; primary responsibility for 
collecting foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence information within the 
United States. 
National Security 
Council 
 
 Manages the overall interagency framework 
for combating terrorism. 
State 
 
Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs 
Chairs coalition subgroup of a National 
Security Council Policy Coordinating 
Committee, which leads U.S 
government efforts to develop strategies and 
activities to obtain international cooperation. 
 Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs 
Implements U.S. technical assistance and 
training to foreign governments on terrorist 
financing. 
 Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism 
Coordinates U.S. counterterrorism policy 
and efforts with foreign governments to 
deter terrorist financing. 
Treasury 
 
Executive Office for 
Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crime 
 
Develops U.S. strategies and policies to 
deter terrorist financing, domestically and 
internationally; develops and implements 
the National Money Laundering Strategy as 
well as other policies and programs to 
prevent financial crimes. 
 Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) 
 
Supports law enforcement investigations to 
prevent and detect money laundering, 
terrorist financing, and other financial crime 
through use of analytical tools and 
information-sharing mechanisms; 
administers the Bank Secrecy Act. 
 Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) Criminal 
Investigation 
Participates in investigations of terrorist 
financing cases with an emphasis on 
charitable organizations. 
 IRS Tax Exempt and 
Government Entities 
 
Administers the eligibility requirements and 
other IRS tax law that apply to charitable 
and other organizations that claim 
exemption from federal income tax. 
 Office of Foreign Assets 
Control 
 
Develops and implements U.S. strategies 
and policies to deter terrorist financing; 
imposes controls on transactions; and 
freezes foreign assets under U.S. 
jurisdiction. 
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 Office of the General 
Counsel 
Chairs Policy Coordination Committee for 
Terrorist Financing, which coordinates U.S. 
government efforts to identify and deter 
terrorist financing; coordinates U.S. 
government actions regarding 
implementation of, and imposition of, 
economic sanctions under Executive Order 
13224 with respect to the freezing of 
terrorist-related assets. 
 Office of International 
Affairs 
Provides advice, training, and technical 
assistance to nations on issues including 
terrorist financing deterrence. 
 
Source: GAO, GAO-04-163, November 2003 
 
A GAO report released in 2004 declared that US law enforcement agencies faced 
continuing challenges in coordinating their efforts under the National Money Laundering 
Strategy (NMLS).
142
 In an earlier report, the GAO stated effective leadership, 
manageable priorities and accountability mechanisms as necessary components of any 
successful strategic plan.
143
  
 
Comparative Questions 
 
 This question assesses where the FIU stands in comparison to those outside of its  
 
national boundaries. 
 
8) How does your FIU (or other intelligence agencies dealing with financial crime) 
compare to those abroad? Better, same or worse? 
 
Benchmarking is the process of ―examining best-in-class organizations and 
attempting to emulate their results.‖144 This process encourages organizations to evaluate 
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their own processes and compare them with those of similar organizations in order to 
achieve the best results. It potentially leads to the organization serving customers better, 
in other words, increased customer satisfaction.
145
 However, some critics argue that 
benchmarking is too time-consuming and expensive.
146
 
 
Technical Question 
 
 This question determines the performance of FIUs in countering newer methods  
 
of financial crime which terrorists use to raise funds. 
 
9) How would you evaluate your FIU‘s focus on financial crime committed through:  
a) international trade through the abnormal pricing of goods?  
b)   the use of informal banking systems, credit/debit cards and the Internet?   
 
 
In Chapter 2, emerging methods of financial crime were discussed. These have 
grown in prominence as governments have clamped down on more traditional modes of 
committing financial crime.  
 
Analysis Of The Administrative Practices In The Netherlands, Canada, The United 
States And Australia 
 
The roles of the FIUs and the length of time they‘ve been in existence vary by 
country. The United States‘ Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) came into 
existence in April 1990
147
 while the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre 
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147.  Federation of American Scientists, ―FINCEN – History,‖ August 30, 1998 [cited on December 28, 
2004]  Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ustreas/fincen/history.htm). 
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of Canada (FINTRAC) is relatively new, having been established in July 2000.
148
 The 
responsibilities of FINTRAC cover money laundering and terrorist financing detection 
while those of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), set 
up in 1988, include the deterrence of tax evasion as well.
149
 A number of FIUs transcend 
national boundaries and work together as part of an informal group called the Egmont 
Group.
150
  
Administrative-Type FIUs 
FIUs differ from one another in structure and reporting authority. This study deals 
with administrative-type FIUs which serve as a link between the entities that report to it 
such as financial institutions, and law enforcement. They are ―either attached to a 
regulatory/supervisory authority, such as the central bank or the ministry of finance, or an 
independent administrative authority.‖151 The advantages and disadvantages of 
administrative-type FIUs are listed in Table 4.  
Table 4-2: Administrative-Type FIUs 
 
Advantages 
1) The FIU acts as an interface between the financial and other sectors subject to the 
reporting obligation, on the one hand, and law enforcement authorities on the other hand, 
thus avoiding the creation of direct institutional links between these institutions and law 
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.  Department of Finance, Canada, ―FINTRAC receives increased funding to combat terrorist financing,‖ 
October 25, 2001. [cited on December 28, 2004]  Available from World Wide Web: 
(http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ustreas/fincen/history.htm). 
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enforcement agencies while bringing disclosures to the attention of law-enforcement 
agencies. 
 
2) Financial institutions are more confident about disclosing information if they know 
that dissemination will be limited to cases of money laundering and financing of 
terrorism and will be based on the FIU‘s own analysis rather than the reporting 
institution‘s limited information. 
 
3) The FIU is a ―neutral,‖ technical, and specialized interlocutor for the 
reporting parties. 
 
4) If the FIU is placed in a regulatory agency, it is the natural interlocutor 
of the financial institutions. 
 
5) Information can be easily exchanged with all types of FIUs. 
 
Disadvantages 
1) Because the FIU is not part of the law-enforcement administration, there may be a 
delay in applying law-enforcement measures, such as freezing a suspicious transaction or 
arresting a suspect, on the basis of financial disclosures. 
 
2) The FIU usually does not have the range of legal powers that law enforcement 
agencies and judicial authorities have to obtain evidence. 
 
3) The administrative-type FIUs (unless they are truly independent) are more subject to 
the direct supervision of political authorities. 
 
Examples of countries with administrative-type FIUs include Andorra, Aruba, Australia, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, 
Israel, the Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, the 
Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine, the 
United States, and Venezuela. 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, The World Bank Group, 2004   
Nineteen interviews were conducted for this study involving personnel from 
administrative-type FIUs: the Office For The Disclosure of Unusual Transactions 
(Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties - MOT) in the Netherlands, the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network in the United States and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
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and related entities. What follows is a country-by-country write-up of these interviews 
segmented along the lines of the BSC and an analysis of the responses beginning with the 
Netherlands. The names of the interviewees have not been disclosed to protect 
confidentiality. 
 
Case 1: The Netherlands - Office For The Disclosure of Unusual Transactions 
(Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties - MOT) 
 
Legal Underpinnings and Organization 
The Office For The Disclosure of Unusual Transactions reports to the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice and is located in Zoetermeer. The head of the agency is supported by 
three units – Financial Investigations, Policy and Analysis, and Systems Management in 
addition to administrative staff which together constitute 26 employees.
152
 Guided by the 
Wet Melding Ongebruikelijke Transacties (Act on the Disclosure of Unusual 
Transactions of 1994) which obligates financial service providers to report unusual 
transactions to MOT
153
, the agency employs fifteen investigators, two policy advisors and 
two information technology specialists to carry out its duties.
154
 It also works closely with 
the Bureau for Police Support of the National Public Prosecutor (BLOM).
155
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The expansion of MOT‘s role over the past 10 years to reporting not only on 
financial but also non-financial transactions, the disclosure of information to other 
governmental agencies such as customs authorities and tax administration and the 
broadening of the definition of money laundering to include tax fraud have generally 
resulted in the annual number of unusual transactions recorded by MOT rising steadily 
from year to year.
156
  After September 11, 2001, the scope of reporting requirements 
imposed by MOT on reporting entities was expanded to include terrorist financing in 
addition to money laundering. In relation to this, the objective of MOT is to ensure that 
transactions involving either of these activities does not take place in the Dutch financial 
system, stated an auditor.
157
  
 While MOT does not have regulatory authority (this is entrusted to the Ministries 
of Justice and Finance), it receives, analyzes and disseminates information just like any 
other FIU stated a civilian agent.
158
 Among those that report to MOT are banks, insurance 
and credit card companies, casinos, lawyers, accountants, notaries, real estate brokers, tax 
advisors, high-value traders, art dealers, auctioneers, and jewelers.
159
 Objective and 
subjective indicators are used to decide whether transactions are ‗unusual‘; if they are, 
there is a legal obligation to report them to MOT. Objective indicators are a set of criteria 
according to which entities are obligated to disclose transactions. Subjective indicators 
are those which would require disclosure subject to the judgment of the entity, that is, 
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transactions where the institution has reason to believe that they are connected with 
money laundering or the financing of terrorism.
160
 A list of indicators is provided in the 
table below: 
Table 4-3: List of Indicators - Unusual Transactions Act 
 
1 November 2005  
 
1) All indicators require disclosure of intended transactions as well as executed 
transactions. 
2) The amounts mentioned apply to: Euro or the equivalent value in foreign currencies. 
3) Transactions which are reported to the police or judicial authorities in connection 
with money laundering, must also be reported to the MOT (number: B 0510111) 
4) Transactions have to be reported as soon as possible, but at least within fourteen 
days after the detection of the unusual character of the transaction. 
 
Objective indicators (Disclosure obligation) 
Transactions with nominated countries 
B 0510100  Transactions with (legal) persons situated in countries or areas, which are 
nominated by the minister of Finance and Justice as an unacceptable risk 
for money laundering and terrorism financing. 
Explanation  No countries have been nominated so far. 
 
Cash transactions 
B 0510133  Cash transactions exceeding € 15,000 whereby one currency is exchanged 
into another currency or whereby small denomination notes are exchanged 
for larger denomination notes. 
Explanation:  This indicator is only used for cash exchange, i.e. transactions using coins 
or banknotes and not for cash deposits or withdrawals.  
 
Money transfers 
T 0510141  Cash transactions exceeding € 2,000 in which monies are furnished in the 
form of notes and coins, checks or by means of a credit or debit card, or 
are made payable in the form of notes and coins, checks or through 
deposits into an account. 
Explanation:  The money transfer was added to the MOT Act as a financial service in 
1998. The indicator can be used by money transfer institutions. To prevent 
mistakes concerning the concept of money transfer the MOT newsletter of 
July 2001 contains an explanation of the definition and examples of MTs. 
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Subjective indicator (Disclosure obligation if according to the judgment of the financial 
institution the following situation is applicable.) 
 
Connected with money laundering or financing of terrorism 
B 0510211  Transactions where the institution has reason to believe that they are 
connected with money laundering or the financing of terrorism. 
 
Source: Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, November 1, 2005 
 
The system of indicators used by MOT changes with time as some indicators are 
deleted and new ones added.
161
 A banker explained that recently, the number of objective 
criteria were reduced while the number of subjective ones were increased giving banks 
more liberty to define their own criteria in reporting potential money launderers and 
terrorist financers.
162
 The changes in these indicators along with other factors could have 
an impact on the number of unusual transactions reported. In 2004, the unusual 
transactions reported fell for the first time since 1996 to 175,000. The bulk of these 
involved money transfers, that is, money transferred into and out of the Netherlands 
without using financial institutions as an intermediary.
163
 The reports submitted by MOT 
to the police rose from 38,000 in 2003 to 41,000 involving EUR 3.2 million.
164
 Such a 
large value calls for the need to conduct investigations effectively and efficiently.  What 
follows is a dissection of MOT‘s performance using the BSC. 
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Business Process Perspective - MOT prides itself on the sophistication of its technology 
which, according to a civilian agent, enables it to process a fairly large volume of reports 
received, analyze them and disseminate them to the relevant police region.
165
 The 
Suspicious Transactions Intranet is the medium through which all 26 police regions can 
view these reports. Besides offering the advantages of a paper-free operation, the Intranet 
enhances cooperation. This is because ―each region can also view information about 
suspicious transactions notified to other regions. In this way, the regions can examine 
whether cooperation would be desirable in a given case.‖166  On a broader scale, the 
Dutch Ministry of Justice was awarded a grant for the development of FIU.NET, ―a 
decentralized computer network designed to connect (EU) Financial Intelligence Units 
(FIUs) using modern technology and computers [in order] to (bilaterally) exchange 
financial intelligence information.‖167 Besides the police, MOT also works closely with 
the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD
168
) and especially with the 
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Rotterdam-Rijnmond regional police
169
 to counter drug smuggling in the Netherlands 
Antilles and Aruba.
170
 
 Operational issues that MOT could address are the lack of influence of its policy-
makers in the decision-making process and the absence of a website in English that 
would help promote its work. Also, MOT uses only a sole qualitative performance 
measure and does not use quantitative performance measures nor does it compare its 
performance to that of other FIUs, according to a civilian agent.
171
 So, how can MOT 
enhance the business aspect of its performance? An auditor calls for it to ―invest more in 
expertise, in estimating and analyzing the nature and the size of money laundering in the 
Netherlands, and in establishing an integral approach towards money laundering (taking 
the whole system as a starting point and all the activities: risk analysis and problem 
definition, prevention, reporting, data-analysis, investigating, administrative punishment, 
prosecuting, criminal punishment, etc.).‖172 
 
Customer Perspective - According to one civilian agent, the relationship between MOT 
and its aforementioned public service counterparts is of utmost importance in the 
AML/CTF chain. As mentioned earlier, MOT has taken concrete steps towards 
collaboration with law enforcement. In fact, plans are underway, to merge with the police 
                                                 
169.  Dutch Ministry of Justice, ―Increased number of unusual financial transactions,‖ July 12, 2005 [cited 
on January 21, 2005]  Available from World Wide Web: 
(http://www.justitie.nl/english/press/press_releases/archive/archive_2005/%5C50715Increased_number_of
_unusual_financial_transactions.asp). 
 
170
.  Anonymous, interview by author, written notes, The Netherlands, June 15, 2005. 
 
171
.  Anonymous, interview by author, written notes, The Netherlands, June 15, 2005. 
 
172
.  Anonymous, interview by author, written notes, The Netherlands, June 13, 2005. 
 
 66 
and form a law-enforcement-type FIU that will increase its staff to seventy-five. 
However, the civilian agent pointed out that there exists frustration that not enough of 
cases result in prosecution as per MOT‘s expectations nor is there enough feedback from 
the police-force.
173
 Besides these public service counterparts, reporting entities are 
viewed as MOT‘s customers. The civilian agent revealed that the reporting entities find 
compliance activities time-consuming.
174
 A banker stressed that some of the reporting 
entities have found MOT‘s reporting criteria not clear ―especially, the criteria for 
international transfers by cash, by banks, need special interpretation.‖175 On the positive 
side, noted the banker, MOT‘s decision to align its requirements with international 
Customer Due Diligence requirements has resulted in convenience in reporting.
176
  
This banker suggested that in order for reporting entities to better comply with the 
concerned regulations, MOT would be better served if its staff were less technical and 
bureaucratic in dealing with reporting entities.
177
  Also, if MOT imposes non-compliance 
penalties that are too soft or compliance requirements that over-impose on customer 
confidentiality or result in heavy compliance costs to the reporting entities, an auditor 
opined, then, the level of compliance could be low.
178
 An auditor also suggested that a 
satisfaction survey with multiple choice and open answer questions conducted among 
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reporting entities would provide useful feedback to MOT in establishing and revising 
reporting requirements. MOT would also enhance its relationship with reporting entities 
by reporting back to them on the outcome of law enforcements‘ investigations of cases 
these entities reported. 
179
 MOT‘s performance with respect to reporting entities can be 
enhanced by keeping track of the transaction costs incurred by these entities in reporting 
unusual transactions, providing clarity in reporting instructions, guaranteeing 
confidentiality of reported information. A good measure with respect to MOT‘s public 
counterparts relates to the quality of information it distributes to them, deliberated an 
auditor.
180
 
 
Learning and Growth Perspective - Among the qualities a financial intelligence analyst 
must ideally possess are technical knowledge in the areas of money laundering and 
terrorist financing and as an auditor put it, ―the ability to analyze the reported information 
not only on a case [by] case basis, but also to determine trends and structure within 
money laundering [and terrorist financing].‖181 Based on these criteria, MOT staff 
members seem well-trained in their field, determined one interviewee. The interviewee 
further added that staff members are set clear expectations, both, for themselves 
individually and for the groups they work in. Specialists within the organization are free 
to enhance their skill and knowledge level by enrolling in appropriate courses. For 
example, one of the policy analysts at MOT has completed a course in compliance. Also, 
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learning on the job is a key component of training. Whenever necessary, technical 
training is provided as with the new intelligence software, Business Objects. Performance 
appraisals are conducted regularly, one of which is a competencies evaluation by the 
Ministry of Justice twice a year. This is besides an annual appraisal conducted by the 
employee‘s manager. If an employee fails to perform up to expectations within a period 
of two competency evaluations and an appraisal, he/she is dismissed, a civilian agent 
explained.
182
  
 
Financial Perspective - Perhaps the biggest impact of budgetary constraint at MOT, in a 
civilian agent‘s opinion, is an expanding agenda with the same number of staff 
members.
183
 Recently, the Dutch government committed more than EUR 400 million 
over five years to counter terrorism and radicalization. This translates to approximately 
600 full-time personnel ―being added to the intelligence, security and investigation 
services involved.‖184  However, an auditor clarified that these funds will be directed 
towards the National Security Agency (AIVD) and other such organizations involved in 
the fight of terrorism and not particularly terrorist financing. 
185
 Perhaps, this is where 
funds are best invested, an auditor and banker felt: expertise in understanding how 
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transgressors operate, work within the criminal network and infiltrate the systems of 
financial and other such institutions.
186,187
  
The success of the government‘s investment will ultimately be determined not by 
its size, pointed out an auditor, but by the way in which it is used, that is, outcomes. This 
translates to what return the government is getting on its investment but when one 
considers the grand scheme of things, the amount of assets frozen or funds confiscated 
(or even money recovered) pale in comparison to the volume of money laundered or used 
to finance terrorism, insisted another interviewee. The auditor went on to explicate that it 
might, therefore, be worth the government‘s while to invest in researching new methods 
of money laundering, such as, the use of underground banking and the Internet to launder 
funds while at the same time (in relation to MOT) continue investing in staff (both in 
terms of adding new staff and enhancing skills and knowledge of existing staff members) 
and the availability and improvement of technology.
188
  The best indicator of MOT‘s 
performance, mused one banker, would be the amount of financial crime these 
investment efforts help deter.
189
  
 
The Dutch began tightening their AML/CTF laws in the 1990s. Until then, stated 
an auditor, its financial system was considered to be a ―relatively free haven for money 
laundering and other financial crimes.‖190 Also, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, both 
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part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, were notorious for being drug trafficking 
centers. This changed, especially, after the events of September 11, 2001 when the Dutch 
government adopted the National Security and Anti-Terrorism Action Plan which 
restructured the supervision of financial markets by streamlining supervisory tasks among 
the Dutch National Bank, the Chamber that oversees the Dutch pension and insurance 
sector, and the Authority of Financial Markets (AFN). However, the system is plagued 
administratively owing to the number of players in the fight against financial crime, their 
over-lapping tasks and the lack of coordination among them. Secondly, there seems to be 
a need for re-evaluation as to what the problem really is, whether the state should be 
involved and if so, how the problem should be defined and approached. Only once this is 
done can an agency establish a suitable performance management system.
191
 A 
fragmented approach to the problem as well as a lack of vision in solving the problem are 
current business practices that need to be addressed for this to happen. 
According to one auditor, the success of any such system is naturally judged by 
the percentage of money launderers or terrorist financers caught. Such a system will 
depend on the approach adopted by all the financial crime-fighting units in the system: 
repressive, that is, the focus is on catching and punishing all money launderers and 
terrorist financiers or preventive, that is, making the possibility of laundering money or 
financing terrorism as difficult as possible.
192
 A banker noted that while MOT operates 
retroactively and the reports it produces in the AML/CTF process are key in money 
laundering and terrorist financing prevention, the success of an AML/CTF system 
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depends, perhaps, even more so on its preventative measures.
193
 Suggested performance 
measures based on the entire chain (financial institutions, MOT, police, justice, special 
investigating institutions, supervisory bodies, etc.) included:   
―a) Catching ratio: (what is the chance that a money launderer is caught by the chain): 
- number of money launderers that investigating institutions have caught in relation to the 
estimated population of money launderers or 
- amount of money that is caught by investigating institutions in relation to the estimated 
total amount of money being laundered  
 
b) Punishing ratio: (what is the chance that a caught money launderer will get punishment 
from the chain): 
The number of caught money launderers that have received a form of 
punishment/sanction (this can be an administrative fine or a sentence to jail). 
 
c) Recidivist ratio: Number of caught money launderers that have been caught and 
punished in earlier cases (indicator of the success of the punishments that are used: low 
punishments are not a barrier to commit the crime again).‖194      
 
An auditor touched upon the cruciality of gathering data to producing the 
performance metrics listed above. The auditor elaborated that data relevant to the 
indicators mentioned above, include ―the number and sort of institutions that report 
unusual transactions the number of processed reports and the processing time of unusual 
cases by MOT, the number of suspicious transactions or cases that are reported by MOT 
to investigating institutions, the number of cases with an administrative sanction, the 
number of cases handed over to justice, the number of cases brought before court, the 
number of convictions, the total amount of money confiscated, the total amount of money 
prevented from being misused (by catching money launderers before they have laundered 
money), the number and type of suspects, the usage of MOT-information in other 
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cases.‖195 Such information, tracked from the beginning of the cycle (information 
reported by an entity) to the end (the court‘s judgment) should be gathered on an annual 
basis, so that performance can be monitored one year against the other.
196
 These would 
help enhance a system that the FATF described in its first round of mutual evaluations as 
―a well-designed, legally comprehensive system which should provide a very effective 
response to the challenge posed by money laundering.‖197 
 In contrast to MOT, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of 
Canada (FINTRAC) uses an elaborate system of performance measures. It is also subject 
to privacy legislation that distinguishes it from other FIUs. The next analysis covers these 
and other aspects of FINTRAC.  
 
Case 2: Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) 
 
Legal Underpinnings and Organization 
 FINTRAC was created in 2000 as an arm‘s length agency from law enforcement 
(no prosecutorial authority) and other government agencies to assist in the fight against 
transnational crime like money laundering and terrorist financing.
198
 Its core function is 
financial transaction case disclosure – ―when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the financial transactions would be relevant to an investigation or prosecution of a money 
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laundering or terrorist activity financing offence or threats to the security of Canada, 
FINTRAC provides the financial intelligence to the appropriate law enforcement, 
intelligence or other designated agencies.‖199 One interviewee disclosed that it made its 
first disclosure in 2002 and has made 450 disclosures since then.
200
 It works to ensure 
that reporting entities are in compliance with the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) 
and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) and works actively with international anti-
financial crime bodies to accomplish its overall objective.  
There are two characteristics of FINTRAC that distinguish it from other, more 
prominent FIUs, according to one interviewee: 1) FINTRAC‘s threshold for suspicious 
transactions being reported is ―the reasonable suspicion that a transaction is subject to 
prosecution.‖201 While it has no written guidelines to help its analysts determine whether 
a transaction is related to money laundering or terrorist financing, it bases its analysis on 
indicators and typologies issued by other FIUs and the FATF.
202
  2) FINTRAC‘s 
authority is limited by Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which states 
―Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.‖203 and the 
Privacy Act which ―imposes obligations on some 150 federal government departments 
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and agencies to respect privacy rights by limiting the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information.‖204 FINTRAC has to work around the restrictions imposed by these 
acts. For example, a government administrator commented on how legislation would 
have to be changed to implement all of the FATF‘s 40 recommendations.205 Also, its 
scope of authority is restricted by legislation and hence, it does not cover certain 
industries like precious metals, explained the administrator.
206
  
 Built around a workforce of 250 employees, FINTRAC is headquartered in 
Ottawa with three regional offices in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. While staff 
members located at its Ottawa headquarters are multi-functional, staff members in the 
other offices play liaison and compliance roles. The Director of FINTRAC oversees the 
operational, management and administrative functions of the agency.
207
 However, the 
main function of suspicious transaction monitoring is performed by the Financial 
Intelligence Analysis department. Being an administrative-type FIU, its duties include 
―analysis to determine whether transactions provide reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the transaction is related to the commission of money laundering or terrorist financing 
offences, assess general trends and patterns of activity, and prepare recommendations for 
disclosures to law enforcement and other appropriate agencies.‖208 It receives functional 
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support from the External Relationships, Information Technology, and Corporate 
Management departments.
209
  
External Relationships develops and maintains relationships between FINTRAC 
and the outside world. It is comprised of International Relationships which is responsible 
for FINTRAC‘s foreign relationships, and Domestic Relationships which is responsible 
for relationships with domestic partners like the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the Canadian Security and Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), reporting entities and 
other domestic stakeholders. External Relationships is also comprised of 
Communications which caters to the information needs of FINTRAC‘s stakeholders and 
maintains FINTRAC‘s website, and Compliance which ensures FINTRAC adheres to 
laws and regulations.
210
  
FINTRAC‘s Information Technology Department serves the technological needs 
of FINTRAC including those of Corporate Management which performs administrative 
functions such as human resources and financial administration for the agency.
211
 Next, 
the performance of FINTRAC based on the Balanced Scorecard is analyzed. 
 
Business Process Perspective - A law enforcement official explained that like other FIUs, 
FINTRAC is a central depository for suspicious financial transactions and therefore, 
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serves as a point of contact for other agencies, both national and international.
212
 It is one 
of the most technologically-intensive FIUs in the world. Of the 10-11 million suspicious 
transaction reports it receives each year, 99% are received electronically, estimated 
another civilian agent. However, this civilian agent added that its database is inaccessible 
to law enforcement and other agencies, giving it more control over the information it 
disseminates and helping it abide by Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and the Privacy Act.
213
 
One government administrator reported that FINTRAC falls under Canada‘s 
Department of Finance.
214
 Another civilian agent elucidated the sub-organization of 
FINTRAC. FINTRAC‘s staff members at its three regional offices (Western, Central, 
Eastern) are assigned various sectors within their region where they ensure that reporting 
entities adhere to compliance guidelines. Each regional office includes a director with 
four deputy directors in charge of corporate, financial intelligence analysis, information 
technology and external relations (compliance) functions. FINTRAC has MOUs with 
regulatory bodies to conduct compliance inspections. What is reported by reporting 
entities is listed in the MOU and FINTRAC works with these entities to ensure 
consistency with reporting guidelines and meeting reporting deadlines. Non-compliance 
penalties include up to $2 million (Canadian) in fines and up to five years 
imprisonment.
215
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Operationally, FINTRAC does have its limitations. The events of 9/11 led to 
FINTRAC‘s mandate being expanded to include terrorist financing from just money 
laundering and this has resulted in a gush of requests and information to the agency, 
explained a law enforcement official. But due to constraints, FINTRAC can handle only a 
certain volume of transactions.
216
 An auditor‘s report revealed that ―law enforcement and 
security agencies normally find that the information FINTRAC discloses is too limited to 
warrant action, given their existing caseloads and scarce resources [and legislation 
limiting the type of information that can be disclosed]. In short, as the system now works, 
FINTRAC disclosures do contribute to existing investigations but rarely generate new 
ones.
217
 This might compromise the security net, in the opinion of a law enforcement 
official.
218
  
The report of the Auditor General on Canada‘s Implementation of the National 
Initiative to Combat Money Laundering, in 2004, revealed a number of organizational 
inconsistencies
219
 within FINTRAC. It found that FINTRAC‘s reporting requirements 
imposed undue administrative burden and expense on reporting entities, computer 
connectivity problems between FINTRAC and the Canada Border Services Agency 
resulted in a large backlog of unprocessed reports on cross-border transactions, lack of an 
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agreement between FINTRAC and the Canada Revenue Agency as to the criteria for 
detecting money-laundering related tax evasion and reluctance on the part of law 
enforcement to always share information with FINTRAC or give much weight to its 
unsolicited disclosures. Law enforcement reportedly found reports received from banks 
more current and useful than those received from FINTRAC; FINTRAC‘s reports lacked 
context, that is, ―what led FINTRAC to suspect the presence of money laundering or 
terrorist financing.?‖220 Thus, the reluctance on the part of law enforcement to allocate 
scarce resources to what might be an exercise in futility.
221
 
 
Customer Satisfaction - According to one civilian agent, FINTRAC‘s customers include a 
wide spectrum of entities involved in the financial intelligence community. FINTRAC 
has ―26 MOUs with other countries and with regulatory bodies such as the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada.‖222 A government administrator 
explained the benefits of having MOUs with domestic regulatory agencies, ―There is a 
two-way benefit. People operating within the sectors don‘t have to see two people show 
up at their door. It helps FINTRAC in its responsibility as FINTRAC has to cover a lot of 
ground for a small agency.‖223 For example, one regulator disclosed, ―FINTRAC and the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) meet regularly to discuss 
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shared information with respect to federally regulated financial institutions (FRFIs) 
AML/CTF programs and their compliance with the PCMLTFA.‖224 
FINTRAC‘s other customers are reporting entities. Its website lists the following 
entities as having reporting obligations: ―financial entities (includes banks, credit unions, 
caisses populaires
225
, trust and loan companies and agents of the Crown that accept 
deposit liabilities), life insurance companies, brokers or agents, securities dealers, 
portfolio managers and investment counselors who are provincially authorized, persons 
engaged in the business of foreign exchange dealing, money services businesses 
(including alternative remittance systems, such as hawala, hundi, chitti, etc.), agents of 
the Crown when they sell money orders, accountants and accounting firms (when 
carrying out certain activities on behalf of their clients or receiving fees for such 
activities), real estate brokers or sales representatives (when carrying out certain activities 
on behalf of their clients), casinos (including those authorized to do business in Canada, 
with slot machines or roulettes or card games, but excluding certain temporary charity 
casinos).‖226 FINTRAC has an extensive outreach program that included more than 500 
information sessions involving reporting entities in the 2003-04 fiscal year and responses 
to 1,800 inquiries from reporting entities during this period.
227
 A good source of 
feedback, suggested a law enforcement official, would be those who are the first in line in 
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the receipt of financial transaction information.
228
 A regulator noted that FINTRAC 
provides substantial feedback to reporting entities.
229
 
Finally, FINTRAC‘s customers are law enforcement and other intelligence 
agencies. Customer satisfaction is measured through feedback from law enforcement. If 
FINTRAC is unable to produce a report on a person or entity that law enforcement needs 
information on, then law enforcement is unhappy, opined one civilian agent.
230
 A 
government administrator laid down the following guidelines as a means of measuring 
customer satisfaction, ―Can people receiving FINTRAC‘s product make a contribution? 
Was it of use? What type of use was it put to? Did it identify activities that were not 
known?‖231  
One civilian agent noted the legal structure that prevents FINTRAC from 
achieving a higher level of satisfaction for its customers. The flow of information from 
FINTRAC to other agencies and law enforcement is restricted due to the nature of 
FINTRAC‘s relationship with them which is arms-length. Therefore, the police force can 
only follow up on investigations with a judicial order in hand. Another problem is that the 
definition of money laundering differs among these agencies, law enforcement and 
FINTRAC which is bound to cause operational problems. FINTRAC can help overcome 
these constraints up to a certain extent by sharing information in a timely manner and 
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increasing its credibility with law enforcement through the relevance of its disclosures.
232
 
This was reinforced by a law enforcement official who stated that FINTRAC would 
certainly benefit from further streamlining data to other agencies.
233
  
 
Learning and Growth Perspective - Half of FINTRAC‘s staff members come from 
government while the other half come from the private sector, stated a government 
administrator, ―People are hired from sectors that have a reporting obligation to 
FINTRAC because it looks for specialized skills when recruiting.‖234 One law 
enforcement official deliberated that FIU staff members should ideally possess a high 
level of knowledge about money laundering. The official felt that FINTRAC staff 
members fit the bill as many of them used to work for the police force and use their 
experience to their advantage.
235
 A civilian agent expounded on the opportunities for 
employee growth and development at FINTRAC. Employees are evaluated based on 
expectations and commitments through two performance appraisals each year. The 
agency trains its employees by providing opportunities to attend workshops and 
conferences like money laundering methodologies, both, within and outside the 
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organization.
236
 One government administrator mentioned that performance agreements 
are established for each employee.
237
 
Employee training at FINTRAC is based on function. Compliance officers can 
avail themselves of workshops that develop their expertise in policy interpretation, risk 
assessment, and quality assurance while financial analysts can advance their knowledge 
in tracking terrorists online, operations of casinos and tax havens. Interaction with experts 
in the academic community and law enforcement agents is encouraged.
238
 FINTRAC also 
runs security awareness sessions for its employees to help them maintain compliance 
with the Center‘s security and privacy policies and practices.239 A civilian agent added 
that a mentorship program for newcomers would be beneficial.
240
 
One civilian agent interviewed revealed that FINTRAC spends approximately 4% 
of its budget salary on training. Proposals for increased funding for organizational 
development are submitted by the Ministry of Finance on FINTRAC‘s behalf. For certain 
items, legislation is required to provide funding to FINTRAC.
241
  
One of the characteristics of FINTRAC‘s organizational development program is 
the Rewarding Excellence initiative which includes ―recognition through informal, 
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instant awards as well as organization-wide celebratory events recognizing both 
individual merit as well as team-based achievements.‖242 A workforce satisfaction 
measurement program is in the works.
243
 As suggested by one government administrator, 
appropriate performance indicators would be the amount of training funds allocated and 
the degree of learning plan development.
244
 
 
Financial Perspective - Interviewers disclosed that new investment at FINTRAC is 
needed for investigations, analysis and technology. A law enforcement official felt that 
investigation is an important part of FINTRAC‘s business and additional investment here 
will help produce reports on a more timely basis.
245
  A civilian agent said that there 
currently appears to be more work than hands and FINTRAC would be better off 
upgrading its analytical ability. Other potential investment areas include creating a 
reporting structure for potential reporting entities such as jewelers and dealers in precious 
stones, the numerous money service businesses that are unlicensed and unregulated, and 
information technology would also be beneficial.
246
 Financial performance is based on 
feedback. A government administrator suggested taking into account value for 
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investment as an indicator of financial performance which can be derived through 
feedback from the agency‘s stakeholders.247 
 
One civilian agent reported that FINTRAC is pending a review by the FATF 
through the third round of mutual evaluations this year.
248
 To its advantage, it has, in 
place, an elaborate performance management system that ties resources, activities, 
outputs and outcomes.
249
 When it comes to implementation and planning, affirmed one 
law enforcement official, ―FINTRAC is well on its way considering it is a relatively new 
agency.‖250 It has begun providing feedback to reporting entities on their contribution to 
specific money laundering and terrorist financing cases.
251
 It is in the process of 
solidifying its relationships with its clients by attempting to enhance the utility, timeliness 
and relevance of its product, assessed a civilian agent. He added that if these lead to 
additional investigations and prosecutions resulting in 20-25% of terrorist financiers 
being caught, it would deem this a success
252
 even though politicians would very much 
like to see money laundering and terrorist financing eliminated completely, disclosed a 
former parliamentarian.
253
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Nevertheless, FINTRAC continues to have a strong emphasis on performance. 
According to a government administrator interviewed, ―Output is measured quarterly and 
annually. It falls on each department to measure success.‖254; FINTRAC issues an annual 
Departmental Performance Report.  In its performance management plan, FINTRAC ties 
expected results to strategic outcomes.
255
 However, the Auditor‘s Report mentioned 
above found that FINTRAC‘s performance management focused only on operations and 
not on the impact of its programs. Even the operational measures such as ―numbers of 
reports received, disclosures made, compliance initiatives introduced, contacts made with 
stakeholders, and memoranda of understanding signed‖256  lacked performance targets.257 
However, FINTRAC is developing an Integrated Performance Management 
Framework
258
 and its implementation should provide the backbone for enhanced 
accountability and disclosure of results of this relatively new FIU.  
A report presented by the Solicitor General of Canada to Parliament, in 1997, 
noted that ―the illicit drug trade in Canada, only one of many profit-rich criminal 
enterprises, generates profits of $10 billion.‖259 Working with its international partners by 
adhering to best practices in information-sharing and developing international 
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comparators to counter money laundering and terrorist financing globally would help 
FINTRAC control such criminal activity and fulfill its obligation to those it is ultimately 
accountable to – the citizens of Canada, levels a former parliamentarian.260 
The next FIU studied is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in the United 
States. This FIU is entrusted with receiving and analyzing suspicious activity reports 
from a vast network of reporting entities across the country. It then disseminates these 
reports to an array of financial crime-fighting agencies.  In the ensuing analysis, these 
functions are discussed according to the perspectives of the BSC. 
  
Case 3: United States of America - Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FINCEN) 
 
Legal Underpinnings and Organization 
FINCEN was created in 1990 as part of the United States Treasury Department by 
Treasury Order Number 105-08.
261
 Its mission was ―to provide a government-wide multi-
source financial intelligence and analysis network.‖262 But its scope of responsibility was 
expanded, in 1994, ―to include regulatory responsibilities for administering the Bank 
Secrecy Act…‖263 After the 9/11 attacks, the USA Patriot Act of 2001 further expanded 
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FINCEN‘s responsibility to terrorist financing besides money laundering.264 However, 
FINCEN is not the only governmental agency within the U.S. Treasury Department with 
these responsibilities; its shares a similar mandate with the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control and the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division.
265
  
FINCEN‘s function is two-fold, ―[It]… is responsible for expanding the 
regulatory framework to industries vulnerable to money laundering, terrorist financing, 
and other crime. Second, FINCEN analyzes and shares the BSA information with U.S. 
law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels, and its international counterparts, 
to help them identify and track the financial aspects of criminal investigations.‖266 In 
order to facilitate carrying out its responsibilities, FINCEN is structured into the 
Regulatory Policy and Programs Division, the Analytics and Liaison Division, the 
Management Programs Division, the Information and Technology Division. Each of 
these has sub-divisions that support its functions which are detailed below.
267
 
The Regulatory Policy and Programs Division engages in activities geared 
towards the administration of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) like developing and 
implementing an anti-money laundering program and reporting regulations, and 
providing support and assisting with compliance with the Act such as imposing civil 
money penalties on non-compliant institutions. The Division also performs risk 
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management as per Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 imposing measures on a 
jurisdiction or financial institution that cause a money laundering concern. It houses the 
new Office of Compliance established as a result of the Riggs Bank case to enhance the 
administration and implementation of the BSA and oversee BSA compliance activities 
conducted by other agencies.
268
 
 The Analysis and Liaison Division is the intelligence arm of FINCEN responsible 
for collecting financial intelligence and analyzing it to determine links to money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crime which it forwards to law 
enforcement and other intelligence agencies. It serves as FINCEN‘s liaison with these 
and international agencies and organizations. Its products include ―threat assessments, 
industry reports, and technical guides to financial transaction mechanisms.‖269 The 
Management Programs Division performs functions such as human resources, financial 
management and administrative services while the Information and Technology Division 
provides technical support to FINCEN.
 270
 What follows is a dissection of FINCEN along 
the lines of the BSC. 
 
Business Process Perspective - FINCEN, noted one civilian agent, ―as the nation‘s 
financial intelligence unit, is responsible for collecting data on certain financial 
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transactions, analyzing that data, and making the data and our findings available to 
authorized law enforcement and regulatory agencies.  The Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network analyzes new money laundering methods and threats as they arise.  These 
analyses are often included in The SAR Activity Review –Trends, Tips, and Issues, which 
[it] publishes under the auspices of the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group.  In the past 
several years, The SAR Activity Review –Trends, Tips, and Issues has included analyses 
of informal value transfer systems, computer intrusion at banks, food stamp fraud using 
electronic benefit transfer cards, and use of automated teller machines to avoid Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA) reporting requirements.‖271 Reporting entities include depository 
institutions, securities and futures industries, money services businesses, and casino/card 
clubs.
272
 The number of annual SAR filings by entity group is presented below: 
Table 4-4: SAR Filing by Reporting Entity Group 
 
Number of Suspicious Activity Report Filings by Year 
Form 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Depository 
Institution 
62,388 81,197 96,521 120,505 162,720 203,538 273,823 288,343 381,671 251,092 
Money 
Services 
Business 
- - - - - - 5,723 209,512 296,284 177,943 
Casinos 
and Card 
Clubs 
85 45 557 436 464 1,377 1,827 5,095 5,754 2,827 
Securities 
& Futures 
Industries 
- - - - - - - 4,267 5,705 3,305 
Subtotal 62,473 81,242 97,078 120,941 163,184 204,915 281,373 507,217 689,414 435,167 
Total 2,643,004 
 
Source: FINCEN: 2006 
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FINCEN has attempted to streamline its structure to help operate more efficiently 
and effectively. In 2004, it cut the number of its managers from 41 to 26.
273
 It has also 
successfully cut down the time it takes to process civil penalty referrals A 1998 GAO 
report stated, ―In 1992, GAO reported that Treasury was taking about 21 months, on 
average, to process civil penalty referrals
274
 for BSA violations. Since then, the average 
has grown to about three years, according to FinCEN data.‖275 However, the current time 
for processing these penalties is 1.3 years, noted one civilian agent.
276
 FINCEN has also 
been at the forefront in its global outreach efforts. It hosts the Egmont Secure web which 
allows FIU members of the Egmont Group to share information through this web 
system.
277
 An intelligence operative expressed that due to the global nature of the 
problems of money laundering and terrorist financing, it is imperative for FINCEN to 
work with other FIUs in spite of the legal restrictions of doing so.
278
 
However, there are a number of other challenges that FINCEN faces with regard 
to its business processes. One of the biggest of these is how to get money service 
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businesses (MSBs) to register so that they can be monitored better. An audit report by the 
Treasury Report recommended ―FINCEN needs to develop and track performance 
indicators to measure how registration is improving BSA compliance by the MSB 
industry, consider clarifying guidance regarding the dollar threshold for MSB 
designation, and continue efforts to address data quality issues with the publicly available 
MSB registration list.‖279  
Another challenge for FINCEN is to improve reporting entities‘ use of its BSA e-
filing system which is a technological report filing option available to reporting entities to 
enhance the security, accuracy and completeness of their reports. It also improves report 
processing times. A Treasury report called for increased outreach on the part of FINCEN 
to raise awareness of this new system created as a result of a requirement by the USA 
Patriot Act.
280
 
One of the drawbacks that FINCEN encounters as a result of the environment it 
operates in, according to one interviewee, is that the United States government is 
fragmented and the resulting lack of coordination impacts the functioning of agencies like 
FINCEN. A former senior government official asserted the need for a central czar, ―Just 
as the Office of National Drug Control Policy coordinates U.S. anti-drug policy, it should 
be the same for financial crime. At the moment, money launderers are more coordinated 
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and sophisticated than the United States government‖281  FINCEN attempts to alleviate 
―the inherent risk of fragmentation, lack of uniformity, and potential lack of 
accountability‖282 by conducting a number of internal control reviews of its operations as 
well as external evaluations.
283
 A former senior government official conceded that a 
number of former leaders at FINCEN have retired or left for the private sector. Hence, in 
order to improve its business process, FINCEN would be better off contracting out 
business or hiring former employees as consultants.
284
 
 
Customer Perspective - FINCEN‘s customers include those from the financial, law 
enforcement and regulatory communities. Service to customers includes issuing case 
support to more than 165 federal, state, and local agencies, issuing approximately 6,500 
intelligence reports each year.
285
 It delegates authority to a number of its federal 
regulatory partners to conduct compliance exams. These federal regulators are assigned 
responsibility by type of financial institution
286
 as shown in the table below:  
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Table 4-5: Regulatory Agencies and Reporting Entities 
 
1) Depository Institutions – The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office 
of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union Administration have been delegated 
authority to examine the depository institutions they regulate for Bank Secrecy Act 
compliance.  
 
2) Securities Broker-Dealers, Mutual Funds, and Futures Commission 
Merchants/Introducing Brokers – FINCEN has delegated examination authority to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
and relies on their self-regulatory agencies (such as the NASD, the NYSE, and the NFA) 
to examine these entities for compliance. 
 
3) Other Financial Institutions – The Internal Revenue Service (Small Business/Self-
Employed Division) has been delegated responsibility for examining all other financial 
institutions subject to Bank Secrecy Act regulation for compliance, including, for 
example, depository institutions with no federal regulator, casinos, and Money Services 
Businesses (MSBs). 
 
Source: US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
 
Customers have expressed the need for FINCEN to follow up on its reports in 
terms of finding out how the information it distributes relates to outcomes. FINCEN 
could also enhance its utility if it by-passed sending reports to the headquarters of 
agencies and distributed them directly among regional offices. At present, FINCEN 
distributes reports to multiple agencies; ensuring that information is better coordinated 
among agencies will also increase its utility. This is especially important in the post-9/11 
era which has probably seen an increase in the number of reports distributed, opined an 
intelligence operative.
287
 Generally, stated this operative, customers find FINCEN 
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responsive to them. FINCEN staff members clarify clients‘ inquiries on reports if 
something is unclear and are very cooperative in this regard.
288
  
FINCEN‘s stakeholders include individuals and businesses that seek regulatory 
advice and guidance, explained a former senior government official.
289
 It helps other 
FIUs to get started and co-ordinates its AML/CTF efforts with other prominent FIUs such 
as Britain, France, Belgium and Australia.
290
 FINCEN should measure efficiency by 
assessing its ability to analyze the information forwarded to it by reporting entities and 
produce final reports for authorized law enforcement and regulatory agencies in a timely 
manner, proposed an intelligence operative. This interviewee assessed that agencies 
appear satisfied in this regard.
291
 A former senior government official suggested 
measuring performance by ―the number of leads forwarded to law enforcement agencies 
and cases for which FINCEN data is used.‖292 This interviewee cautioned that FINCEN‘s 
resources are mostly directed towards the regulated sectors and more could be spent on 
enhancing its service to law enforcement.
293
  
 
Learning and Growth Perspective - FINCEN has fewer than 200 employees most of 
which are permanent staff with experiential backgrounds in intelligence, the financial 
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industry and computers. Additionally, it has 40 long-term detailees
294
 from 21 regulatory 
and law enforcement agencies.
295
 FINCEN has a training office that assesses and 
strengthens the competencies of its employees. It has also implemented a new employee 
performance system
296
 which is linked to the organization‘s strategic plan and replaces 
the old pass-fail employee rating system.
297
 Finally, FINCEN conducts employee 
satisfaction surveys and follows up on recommendations from them.
298
 
When it comes to current personnel, a former senior government official 
complained that FINCEN lacks ―leadership, vision and organization. FINCEN staff is 
well-trained but middle and senior management is inexperienced.‖299 This former official 
added that FINCEN looks for employees to have the skill and knowledge to carry out all-
source analysis.
300
 Producing outcomes in terms of human resources is time-consuming 
for intelligence agencies. An intelligence official cited an example that if an agency 
wants to hire analysts, it will have to find those who fit the bill, that is, those who will be 
willing to work at a particular salary, those who clear necessary security checks and those 
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who pass the training program.
301
 The former senior government official mentioned the 
need for FINCEN to hire more personnel with a law enforcement background.
302
 
 
Financial Perspective - FINCEN conducts assessments to find out the necessity of 
strengthening management control over its resources.
303
 Over the past two years, 
explained a civilian agent, FINCEN has ―invested heavily in [its] regulatory function 
(tasks required in [its] role as Administrator of the Bank Secrecy Act) and in a new Bank 
Secrecy Act data management and dissemination system called BSA Direct.‖304 
Additional investment in technology to hasten criminals being caught would be helpful. 
Financial performance should be measured in terms of improved efficiency and not in 
terms of case size. Cases differ in size and importance and it is important to stop crime 
irrespective of these factors, opined an intelligence operative.
305
 
According to a civilian agent, it is difficult to judge success in the AML/CTF 
world as no one quite knows the number of money launderers or the amount of money 
laundered. FINCEN doesn‘t compare its performance to that of other FIUs but measures 
performance by how well it progresses towards its goals. This includes a number of self-
evaluations, a list of which is presented in the table below.
306
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Table 4-6: Internal/External Reviews Conducted by FINCEN 
 
1) Internal work process reviews that are used as a basis for improving programs and 
processes. 
  
2) Internal control reviews used to evaluate and, if needed, to strengthen 
management controls over resources. 
  
3) Internal reviews of technology, case management and other issues that are used as 
a basis for making strategic decisions.  
 
4) Customer satisfaction surveys, which are used to identify strengths and 
opportunities to improve services to external clients, including law enforcement 
agencies, regulators, and the financial industry. 
 
5) Employee satisfaction surveys, which are used as a basis for making  
decisions related to human resources activity, employee communications, and 
other management areas.  
 
6) External evaluations of major program activities, which are contracted for as      
      needed and used in strategic planning. 
 
Source: FINCEN 2006 
 
A former senior government official raised a number of questions that serve as 
food for thought about the future direction of FINCEN, ―Planning should focus on its 
mission: should it be a law enforcement agency?, should it be split into two bodies – 
regulatory and law enforcement, is law enforcement doing enough with FINCEN data? 
(They don‘t have adequate resources to do everything.)‖307 However, this interviewee 
conceded that it has been hard for FINCEN because it was incepted at around the same 
time as the regulation it oversees and therefore, has had to evolve with the regulation.
308
 
The general issue with American intelligence seems to be the lack of vision to 
alleviate the risk associated with preventing terrorist attacks, summed up one 
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academician in the field. This interviewee stated that legislators have allocated billions of 
dollars towards the effort but need to be more vigilant as to how these funds are being 
used. The focus of the U.S. Government should be on proximate outcomes and not just 
by looking at a ‗high-risk list‘ or analyzing worst-case scenarios. There are institutional 
inconsistencies in the U.S. Government‘s ‗war on terror‘. For example, a lack of security 
clearances for local government officials compromises information-sharing with them. 
This should be a time for establishing relationships, strategic analysis and reporting, and 
capacity-building within established networks.
309
  
A lawyer backed up this claim that FINCEN lacked vision. He stated that 
intelligence officials have a tendency to ―shoot first and ask questions later.‖310 This 
interviewee further explained that the government‘s first course of action is to freeze 
action and conduct an investigation later. It takes time to trace money, therefore, advised 
this interviewee, intelligence agencies should ―look before they leap.‖311 Former GAO 
director of federal budget issues, Dr. Paul Posner, provides a fitting conclusion, ―Roles 
and responsibilities within and between levels of government and with the private sector 
are evolving and need to be clarified…Officials also need a baseline set of performance 
goals and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness, especially 
considering that capabilities to respond to an attack vary widely across the country...‖312 
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In other words, it takes more for the government to solve the problem than just throw 
money at it.  
 
Money laundering and terrorist financing are major problems in the U.S. Its 
proximity to the drug-producing countries of South America along with its size and 
sophisticated financial systems make the U.S. the object of money laundering activity.
313
 
Its status as a global powerhouse, combined with aggressive foreign policy, have made it 
a target for terrorists. The implementation of the FATF‘s Forty Recommendations against 
money laundering and terrorist financing is seen as an overall government responsibility 
(not just FINCEN), one interviewee reported.
314
 The U.S. is still awaiting evaluation in 
the third round of mutual evaluations with the FATF. In the second round of mutual 
evaluations, the FATF reported that ―the U.S. anti-money laundering system is very 
complex; and the large number of law enforcement and regulatory agencies, the huge 
number of financial institutions, the diversity of federal and state laws, and the absence of 
comprehensive statistics to inform resource allocation decisions militate against a fully 
effective and efficient system. However, the U.S. commitment to combating money 
laundering at all levels of government is outstanding.‖315 
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Case 4: Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
Legal Underpinnings and Organization 
Established in 1989, AUSTRAC serves as: 1) Australia‘s specialist FIU and 2) 
Australia‘s anti-money laundering regulator operating under the provisions of the 
Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (FTR). As an administrative-type FIU, 
AUSTRAC first collects data on financial transactions reported to it by financial services 
and gaming entities, solicitors and the public. It then analyzes the data before dispersing 
it to the appropriate government agency. Within this mandate, AUSTRAC provides 
assistance to law enforcement efforts to prevent tax evasion, smuggling, money 
laundering and drug trafficking, and terrorist financing. AUSTRAC also plays the role of 
anti-money laundering regulator, monitoring reports of financial transactions stipulated 
under the FTR Act, especially from the financial services and gaming industries.
316
 
AUSTRAC has set up offices around the country to carry out its responsibilities 
with its head office in Sydney.  Work is dispensed through three main branches – Money 
Laundering Deterrence, Money Laundering Targeting and Information Technology. The 
role of the Money Laundering Deterrence branch involves educating cash dealers, 
solicitors and the public associated with the financial services and gaming industries on 
the financial transaction reporting provisions contained in the FTR Act, and evaluating 
reporting systems.  It ensures the accuracy of the data it receives and disseminates and 
conducts periodic inspections of its reporting entities.  The Branch plays a role in 
ensuring the relevancy of anti-money laundering legislation through regular updates. Part 
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of its duty includes providing corporate assistance to AUSTRAC by handling financial 
management and budgetary, human resources, property management, and privacy and 
security issues.  The Branch is comprised of the Reporting and Compliance section, the 
Privacy and Security section, the Strategic Coordination section, and the Corporate 
Services section that help it carry out its responsibilities.
317
   
The Money Laundering Targeting branch analyzes and disseminates financial 
transaction reports information to the 28 law enforcement, revenue, national security, and 
social justice agencies and the 35 overseas FIUs with which AUSTRAC has information 
exchange agreements. The Branch is divided into the Partner Liaison and Support, the 
Monitoring and Analysis, and the International sections to perform its duties effectively.  
The Monitoring and Analysis section plays a key role in tracking suspicious financial 
transactions through an automated monitoring system, TargIT. Assessment reports are 
then provided to partner agencies for the purpose of assisting them in their respective 
investigations. The International section provides technical assistance to foreign FIUs and 
participates in various forums through AUSTRAC‘s membership in the Egmont Group of 
FIUs and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. 
AUSTRAC‘s third branch, Information Technology, provides technology support 
to the other branches.
318
 It is a key driver of the organization‘s performance which is 
discussed next based on the Balanced Scorecard methodology.  
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Business Process Perspective – The information AUSTRAC receives from reporting 
entities is represented in Table 1. A policy analyst cited ‗defensive reporting‘ as a 
criticism 
Table 4-7: Types of Information Reported to AUSTRAC 
1) Significant Cash Transaction Reports: cash dealers and solicitors are required to report 
all domestic transactions involving AUD $10,000 cash or more.  
2) Suspect Transactions Reports: cash dealers provide these reports when they suspect 
tax evasion or a breach of Commonwealth, state or territory law. Suspect Transactions 
Reports are reported without the customer‘s knowledge.  
3) International Funds Transfer Instructions Reports: cash dealers are required to 
provide these reports when funds are telegraphically transferred or wired into or out of 
Australia. The funds may be for any amount, cash or otherwise.  
4) International Currency Transfer Reports: individuals are required to provide these 
reports when they physically transport cash of $10,000 (Australian or foreign equivalent) 
or more into or out of Australia. 
 
Source: Australian Taxation Office, 2005 
whereby entities report more than what is necessary in order to comply with the 
regulations and avoid punishment.
319
 One consultant confirmed that this raises a question 
about the quality of data received, that is, is it suspicious?
320
 The policy analyst also 
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brought to attention the cost burden imposed on reporting entities.
321
 A civilian agent 
explained that AUSTRAC analyzes reported data before proceeding to disseminate it 
based on typology - tax evasion, welfare fraud, money laundering and terrorist 
financing.
322
  
One of the strengths of AUSTRAC‘s business process is the involvement of 
outside parties. One policy analyst disclosed that it uses external consultants and that it 
has an information-exchange system with law enforcement, ―Round-table meetings for 
all areas of financial crime such as the Office of National Assessments and state police 
are held every month. Documents and conclusions are drafted from these meetings. For 
example, the future of cyber crime is looked into: what‘s going to happen in 10 years.‖323  
One consultant informed us that AUSTRAC has set the bar for FIUs when it 
comes to technology.
324
 This includes its data mining applications which have ―greatly 
strengthened [its] ability to analyze data, identify financial networks and locate reporting 
and compliance information to assist in its regulatory function‖325, ProviderNet and its 
electronic data delivery system (EDDSWeb system) which allow cash dealers to report 
electronically, AUSTRAC‘s Regulatory Risk Assessment System (ARRAS) with which 
it is able to identify entities and industries at risk and take appropriate action and its 
TRAQ Enquiry System (TES) database through which its partner agencies can access 
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financial transaction reports. AUSTRAC shares its technological prowess with other 
FIUs through a mentoring program.
326
 
 When it comes to measuring performance, a policy analyst prescribed monitoring 
the percentage of suspect transaction reports.
327
 In 2004-05, AUSTRAC received 17,212 
of these, up 49.9% from the previous year.
328
 However, one consultant insisted that the 
quality of intelligence in reports is important and not the number.
329
 
 
Customer Perspective – The interviewees revealed that AUSTRAC‘s customers are law 
enforcement to whom it provides intelligence. Its customers are also industry sectors to 
whom AUSTRAC provides training on regulation and software for reporting. Its other 
customers include government, partners in intelligence and the FATF.
330
,
331
,
332
. The 
policy analyst and consultant made it known that AUSTRAC has been successful in 
forming partnerships with other agencies. In total, it has established memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) with 28 partner agencies in Australia.
 333,334 
The policy analyst 
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felt that the majority of the Australian public wasn‘t aware or interested in money 
laundering.  Nevertheless, tighter regulations affect the customer in terms of time and 
money. For example, a customer might find it a nuisance to produce identification just to 
play at the slot machine at the casino.
335
 
 AUSTRAC has established a strong bond with the international community, as 
one consultant revealed, ―As an FIU, AUSTRAC is held in high esteem. The requests for 
AUSTRAC processes and provisions have been numerous.‖336 AUSTRAC recently 
completed the Australia-Indonesia Intelligence Unit Cooperation Project through which it 
helped Indonesia develop its FIU.
337
 It also has established a strong relationship with 
other anti-money laundering networks and FIUs like FINCEN through its 46 MOUs with 
FIUs and its association with the Egmont Group and the Asia Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering explained one consultant.
338
  
 AUSTRAC uses technology to reach out to its customers. An example of this is 
the AML eLearning application which serves as ―a tool in providing basic education on 
the process of money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the role of AUSTRAC in 
identifying and assisting investigations of these crimes.‖339 It has a regulatory educational 
program for cash dealers that helps high risk and new dealers to fulfill their reporting 
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obligations under the FTR Act and to report correctly and on time.
340
 AUSTRAC also 
gets reporting entities, industry bodies and partner agencies involved in the decision-
making process via consultations through the Provider Advisory Group (PAG) and 
Gaming Provider Advisory Group (GPAG).
341
 It convenes and participates in various 
working groups and fora in which relevant personnel from industry and government 
agencies participate.
342
 
AUSTRAC personnel work onsite with its partner agencies like the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organization and personnel from partner agencies like the 
Australian Crime Commission work onsite at AUSTRAC‘s Sydney office to enhance 
cooperation and collaboration.
343
 AUSTRAC provides law enforcement with access to its 
system but the relationship between the two could be improved by increasing mutual 
feedback, according to a consultant. This interviewee said that AUSTRAC could also 
improve its relationship with cash dealers by providing feedback to them.
344
 Overall, this 
would help AUSTRAC increase its efficiency in tracing money laundered through new 
trends. As the consultant put it, ―With regard to industry sectors, AUSTRAC should 
monitor trends internationally, report trends to reporting community and reflect trends in 
their own analytical systems in-house. Police, on the other hand, should be reporting new 
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trends to AUSTRAC. It is a 2-way street.‖345 A good measure of performance, suggested 
this consultant, is the percentage of intelligence provided that is actually being used in 
investigations.
346
  
 
Learning and Growth Perspective – According to a civilian agent, AUSTRAC engages in 
workforce planning to make sure that employees develop skills appropriate to performing 
their jobs well.
347
 One consultant elaborates, ―AUSTRAC has a specialist in workforce 
planning that does a skill inventory analysis. Staff can avail of a number of courses from 
technical to management development. A Myers Briggs test is used. A gap analysis is 
conducted before training employees. The mutual evaluation outcome has been 
communicated to staff.‖348 Personnel are evaluated on a quarterly basis based on their 
performance agreements. Employees can avail of training and development opportunities 
to meet the requirements of their performance agreements.
349
 In spite of offering 
employees opportunities for growth and development, AUSTRAC has a hard time 
retaining personnel as they have to compete with the private sector. One consultant 
opined that the best personnel in the field are hired by consulting agencies.
350
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In order to manage performance, one consultant suggested measuring the time 
employees have been on the job in relation to competencies acquired on the job and 
competencies acquired in relation to the requirements of the job.
351
 A policy analyst 
suggested that AUSTRAC should prepare its personnel for increased reporting as a result 
of impending new money laundering legislation that will increase the number of 
reporting entities. It should also get them ready to analyze new trends in money 
laundering and terrorist financing that this new legislation will result in, ―What is 
important here is what you do in training, how often you do it and how imaginative you 
are (mode of delivery). Organizations do not spend enough time and resources on 
training. They don‘t take money laundering seriously enough.‖352  
 
Financial Perspective - The Australian government determines priorities for AUSTRAC 
and ties these to outputs and outcomes. There is essentially one output, that is, to reduce 
money laundering. AUSTRAC develops a business plan and sets targets to achieve this. 
According to a civilian agent, it is up to the Australian government to decide whether to 
adopt a broader range of outputs and outcomes.
353
  
One consultant suggested that AUSTRAC would benefit by increasing investment 
in compliance inspections of reporting entities.
354
 A policy analyst commented about the 
reality of the nature of financial crime, that is, if the government invests in countering 
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one method of financial crime, occurrences of crime through other methods will increase. 
Criminals are always finding ways to re-invent themselves. Subsequently, investment in 
implementing the FATF‘s 40 Recommendations will not stop money laundering but 
mitigate it.
355
 A suggested measure for monitoring an agency‘s financial performance by 
one consultant is the ability of the agency to meet its budget.
356
 
 
 In October 2005, Australia went through a third round of mutual evaluation with 
the FATF. This report noted that the amount of money laundering in Australia was 
estimated to be between 2 and 3 million Australian dollars. Criminals use financial 
service and gaming providers to launder money using false identities in the process. They 
move these funds offshore through international funds transfers and also move funds 
using alternative remittance dealers among other methods.
357
  The report suggested that 
AUSTRAC apply due diligence requirements to other financial entities such as insurance 
companies besides cash dealers. It questioned the reliability of documents that can be 
used to meet the requirements of the 100-point identification system that is used by 
banks. AUSTRAC was characterized as an agency with limited resources that lacked the 
necessary ―supervisory skills and training required to conduct on-site inspections and 
enforcement related activities‖358 and with limited powers to impose criminal sanctions. 
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However, much of this responsibility lies with other agencies such as the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC). 
 AUSTRAC is an agency with one output, that is, to reduce money laundering, 
commented one civilian agent.
359
 It is considered the most advanced FIU in the world, 
suggests another, even though this might be because it has a lot fewer people to deal with 
given the relatively small size of the Australian population. However, there are both 
micro- and macro-policy issues to consider within the AML/CTF framework in Australia. 
The micro-issues include maintaining autonomy for AUSTRAC, as one consultant points 
out, it is now under the Attorney-General‘s portfolio.360 This consultant also laments that 
the industry sectors lack knowledge on money laundering typologies and fail to adopt 
these in their risk-based strategic plans.
361
 Another policy analyst prescribes ‗lateral 
thinking‘ in countering terrorism, that is, thinking along the same lines as terrorists and 
other criminals. This analyst cites the example of hawalas – the government should first 
admit that they exist and then find how to deal with them. They should not only talk to 
these businesses but also their customers. If these businesses are required to register, 
there are those that will use unregistered businesses. The analyst stated that alternative 
methods of terrorist financing like over- and under-invoicing of goods is used because 
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trade receipts and records are not being scrutinized.
362
 Like with the previous three FIUs 
discussed earlier, AUSTRAC‘s focus on outcome monitoring is limited. This and other 
findings are discussed next.  
 
Key Findings 
This chapter exposed problems common among FIUs. The most mentioned 
among them is the lack of performance metrics that integrate the outcome of reporting of 
suspicious transactions, analyzing them, gathering evidence and building a case against 
suspected financial criminals, and indicting and prosecuting them. Interviewees 
questioned the value of output measures, such as the number of SARs received, currently 
used by FIUs. They stressed the importance of outcome measures such as the number and 
value of prosecutions and convictions as well as qualitative measures such as the 
timeliness and accuracy of reports forwarded by the FIU to law enforcement and other 
intelligence agencies. 
Each FIU in this study has its own method of self-assessment. The ones in North 
America and Australia use operational performance measures while the one in Europe 
does not. It cannot be denied that the effectiveness of the FIU in achieving its objective 
depends as much on its own performance as on that of other links in the chain of 
authority: financial institutions, MOT, police, justice, special investigating institutions, 
supervisory bodies etc. Therefore, even if each national system possesses or lacks a set of 
operational performance measures, there must be a broader set of measures to track the 
performance of the entire chain of authority in countering financial crime. In other words, 
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the current focus on outputs or widget counting must lead to a broader focus on 
outcomes. Performance measures suggested by the interviewees are presented in the table 
below. It should be noted here that some of these measures also constitute outcome 
measures. 
 
Table 4-8: Suggested Performance Measures by Country Using the Balanced 
Scorecard 
 
 Business 
Process 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
Learning and 
Growth  
Financial 
The 
Netherlands 
None - Amount of 
transaction 
costs incurred 
by reporting 
entities 
- Clarity in 
reporting 
instructions 
provided to 
reporting 
entities 
- Quality of 
information 
provided to 
public 
counterparts 
None - Return on 
investment in 
terms of how 
much financial 
crime did FIU‘s 
efforts help 
deter. 
Canada None - Value of 
information 
provided by 
FIUs to law 
enforcement 
- Percentage of 
funds allocated 
to training 
- Degree of 
learning plan 
development 
- Value of 
investment 
based on 
feedback from 
customers 
The United 
States 
- Number of 
cases for which 
FIU data is 
used 
- Number of 
leads to law 
enforcement 
agencies  
None - Degree of 
improved 
efficiency 
resulting in 
monetary 
savings  
Australia - Number of 
suspect 
transaction 
- Percentage of 
intelligence 
provided that is 
- The time 
employees have 
been on the job 
- Ability of the 
FIU to meet its 
budget 
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reports 
- Quality of 
intelligence in 
suspicious 
transaction 
reports 
used in 
investigations 
in relation to 
competencies 
acquired on the 
job 
- Competencies 
acquired on the 
job in relation 
to the 
requirements of 
the job 
 
General Outcome Measures:  
1) Number of money launderers interdicted in proportion to the total number of 
money launderers. 
2) Amount of laundered money interdicted in proportion to the total amount of 
laundered money.  
3) Number of money launderers convicted 
4) Number of repeat offenders 
 
Chapter Summary 
The FIUs in this study are at a stage where much progress has been made over the 
years and with changing times and events. Yet, there is also room for improvement on a 
number of fronts based on the assessment of a policy analyst. These are:  
 Lack of resources to perform vital functions such as trend analysis is a common 
problem among FIUs. Investment in infrastructure is always beneficial but some 
FIUs have focused too much on technological resources and not enough on 
human resources.  
 FIU success is a product of political will. When FIUs are not part of a country‘s 
national strategy, as is the case with some countries, they lack the power to make 
an impact in the fight against financial crime. FIUs play an important role in the 
fight against financial crime just as much as the FBI and IRS and one of its vital 
functions is to share information with them.   
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 Problems encountered by FIUs take time to fix and a long-term commitment. As 
is often the case, FIUs are too quick to take credit for success and do not take the 
time to think through solutions to these problems. In order to solve problems, 
FIUs must work within the system, within the context of who they are serving, 
whether it is prosecution, law enforcement or another entity. 
 High staff turnover at FIUs due to more attractive private sector salaries continues 
to be a concern as well as the rising average age of FIU staff members. FIUs have 
relied on outsourcing to get around the problem of losing their institutional 
memory. 
The interviewee suggested that in order to be successful, FIUs must first look within their 
borders and estimate the nature and size of the problem as success is measured against 
the magnitude of the problem. Investment in money laundering and terrorist financing 
should vary with the prevailing degree of the problem and should justify a menace that 
―touches more people than murder.‖363  Another policy analyst noted that communication 
in the form of feedback between FIUs and those entities that it deals with is an essential 
ingredient for FIU performance enhancement. However, feedback is restricted by 
confidentiality and security issues.
364
  An attempt was made to substantiate the findings 
of this chapter with the help of surveys that reached out to a much larger sample. The 
next chapter summarizes the results of the survey.   
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CHAPTER V 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AFFECTING THE 
COUNTERING OF FINANCIAL CRIME 
 
The objective of this chapter is to test some of the findings of the interviews 
conducted in the previous chapter with the help of the knowledge and expertise of a 
substantially larger group of those experienced in the field of financial crime. It gathers 
expert opinion, both within and outside the U.S., on what the drivers of financial crime 
are, the impediments to countering them, how FIUs have performed in countering the 
various types of financial crime, how they have performed before and after 9/11, the 
adequacy of their funding and which performance measures will enhance their 
performance. This is part of the triangulation strategy adopted for the study aimed at 
answering questions stated at the outset. This chapter details the specifics involved in 
carrying out this quantitative part of the study next. 
Administration Of The Survey 
The study involved a self-administered survey of a purposive sample. The target 
respondents are the same group of experts that were used for the interviews: reporting 
entities, law enforcement, politicians and bureaucrats and experts on the subject. The 
survey was conducted among 300 experts in the field of financial crime – 150 in the 
United States and 150 abroad. The reason for the split was to avoid over-sampling one 
group over the other. A total of 100 responses were received – 50 from the United States 
and 50 from abroad – which represented a response rate of approximately 30% which 
was anticipated.  These included 27 financial institution personnel, 3 civilian agents, 20 
law enforcement personnel, 8 academicians, and 42 consultants. The U.S. group has an 
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average of approximately 14 years of work experience while the non-U.S. group has an 
average of approximately 8 years of work experience. The respondent group had a high 
level of education. A majority of the respondents in the U.S. (52% or 26) hold a post-
graduated degree, 34% (or 17) of these respondents are college graduates while 14% (or 
7) of these respondents have some college education. Among the non-U.S. group, 54% 
(or 27) of the respondents have Masters, Ph.D., or J.D. degree, 44% (or 22) of the 
respondents have an undergraduate degree and 2% (or 1) of them have some college 
education. 
In analyzing the results, a non-parametric test was used because in addition to 
lack of generalizability, the sample was relatively small and purposive. Due to the small 
size of known experts in the field, the process of snowballing was used. Earl Babbie 
explains snowball sampling as ―collecting data on the few members of the target 
population you can locate, and then asking those individuals to provide the information 
needed to locate other members of that whom they happen to know.‖365 Specifically, the 
Mann-Whitney U test was used in order to test the statistical significance of the 
difference in responses between the U.S. and non-U.S. groups. This test was used 
because the involved sample is not random and relatively small. If the p-value is greater 
than 0.05, then the Mann-Whitney test concludes that the observed differences between 
the U.S. and non-U.S. groups have no statistical significance at the 95% significance 
level. The corollary is: if the p-value is less than 0.05, then the Mann-Whitney test 
concludes that the observed differences between the U.S. and non-U.S. groups do have 
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some statistical significance at the 95% significance level. What follows is an analysis of 
the survey responses. 
The purpose of this survey is to solicit responses to the following questions from 
experts and practitioners in the field: 
Question 1: Is there a difference in performance between U.S. and non-U.S. FIUs? 
Question 2: What are the drivers of financial crime and the impediments to countering it 
successfully? 
Question 3: What is the funding shortfall in countering financial crime? 
Question 4: What are the performance metrics that will help enhance the performance of 
FIUs? 
These questions were framed based on responses received during the interviews 
that needed further probing. For example, the international comparative aspect of this 
study necessitates the first question. The drivers of financial crime and the impediments 
in solving them were touched on by the interviewees in Chapter IV; the responses to the 
second question will help rank them in order of impact. Lack of funding has been a 
constant problem cited by interviewees in countering financial crime. The third question 
is aimed at garnering responses that specify a range of funding shortfall. Finally, the 
fourth question enables respondents to rate performance metrics they think are most 
important in tackling the problem at hand. Responses to this and the other questions serve 
as a means to support or reject this study‘s hypothesis.   
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Results Of The Survey 
 The survey findings can be summarized in four main points. These are supported 
by anecdotal evidence not only covering financial crime but also the larger context of 
terrorism. 
I. America is more of a terrorist target than other countries due to its unique global 
position as ‘superpower’ and its representation as vanguard of Western civilization, 
secularism and values. However, its FIUs do not face a more difficult task 
countering financial crime nor does their level of performance significantly vary 
from their non-U.S. counterparts. 
America‘s uniqueness in the ‗war on terror‘ 
There is no statistically significant difference between the perceptions of the U.S. 
and non-U.S. group. In describing America‘s vulnerability to terrorism, Michael Kirk, 
producer of PBS‘ Frontline suggested: ―This is a fundamental war where people who 
have come through a time machine from 600 years ago have looked at our modern 
society and decided they don't like what they see. And they want to end it.‖366 Survey 
respondents confirmed this sentiment. Among the total U.S. respondents, most either 
agreed (17 or 34%) or strongly agreed (14 or 28%) with it; only 12% of the total 
respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed. Among the total non-U.S. 
respondents, the results were strikingly similar. Most either agreed (17 or 34%) or 
strongly agreed (10 or 20%) that America is more susceptible to terrorist attacks than 
other countries while 22% (or 11) disagreed or strongly disagreed with this. Flynn (2004) 
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outlines the serious threat posed to world capitalism if America is hurt as a result of 
terrorist attacks.
367
 
While survey respondents confirmed expectations that America is more of a target 
of terrorists than any other country, contrary to expectations, they did not concur that it is 
more difficult for U.S. intelligence to combat financial crime than non-U.S. intelligence. 
However, 46% (or 23) of the total U.S. respondents and 40% (or 20) of the total non-U.S. 
respondents disagreed with this statement. To the contrary, only 22% (or 11) of the total 
U.S. respondents and 14% (or 7) of the total non-U.S. respondents agreed with this. A 
summary of the results are presented in the table below. 
Table 5-1: U.S. and Non-U.S. Respondent’s Opinion on America as a Terrorist 
Target and Its Relative Difficulty in Countering Terrorism 
 
Ratings 
 
America is more of a terrorist 
target than other countries 
U.S. FIUs face a more difficult 
task countering crime 
U.S. % (n=49)  Non-U.S. % 
(n=49)  
U.S. % (n=50) Non-U.S. % 
(n=49) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
8 10 6 20 
Disagree 4 12 46 40 
Somewhat 
Agree 
24 22 20 20 
Agree 34 34 22 14 
Strongly  
Agree 
28 20 6 4 
Mann-
Whitney Rank 
(p-value) 
0.931 0.914 
 
While the U.S. has played the lead role in the ‗war on terror,‘ it has sought and 
formed alliances with countries globally. This is substantiated in the preface of a 2001 
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report by the U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, ―[T]errorism cast 
its lethal shadow across the globe--yet the world's resolve to defeat it has never been 
greater. . . . This chilling report details the very clear and present danger that terrorism 
poses to the world and the efforts that the United States and our partners in the 
international community are making to defeat it. The cold, hard facts presented here 
compel the world's continued vigilance and concerted action.‖368 Countering financial 
crime is a global effort and its difficulty is shared by all. 
 
The performance of FIUs: U.S. vs. non-U.S. 
The U.S. and non-U.S. respondents were congruent in their assessment of the 
performance of their respective FIUs before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks and 
there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups in this regard. 
Performance of FIUs has improved after the attacks which could be attributed to the 
tightening of AML/CTF controls post-9/11. In the U.S., only 20% (or 10) of the total 
respondents rated FIU performance as good or very good before 9/11. This number 
jumped to 50% (or 25) in post-9/11 ratings. Similarly, outside the U.S., 30% (or 15 of the 
total respondents) rated FIU performance as good or very good before 9/11 while 54% 
(or 27) rated FIU performance as good or very good after the attacks. The change in this 
perception is possibly a result of tightening the legislative noose around financial crime 
post-September 11, 2001 that gave intelligence agencies wide-ranging powers to track 
down financial criminals. However, general opinion suggests that there is still work to be 
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done. Newly appointed CIA director General Michael Hayden proved this point in an 
interview when he was asked to describe U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, ―Certainly, we have 
put a lot of energy into it.  There have been a lot of successes.  But as other folks in 
uniform are fond of saying, the enemy gets a vote, too.‖369  
Post-9/11 measures already discussed in this study have possibly resulted in the 
improvement in FIU performance. However, reports suggest there is even more room for 
improvement. For example, a bipartisan commission report, Terrorist Financing, released 
by the Council on Non-U.S. Relations accused the Bush government of lacking the 
political will to compel other governments to combat terrorist financing more 
stringently.
370
 In Canada, FINTRAC investigators ―were reportedly surprised to discover 
that the cash tied to terrorism had risen to 10 percent of the total from less than 5 percent 
the previous year…Despite the large and apparently increasing scale of terrorist 
fundraising in Canada, the government has yet to file a charge.‖371 The table below is 
testimonial to the perceived differences in FIU performance before and after 9/11. 
This table also reflects respondents‘ views on FIU performance in countering 
traditional financial crime (committed through the banking system) and non-traditional 
methods of financial crime (such as that committed via international trade). A majority of 
the total U.S. respondents (52% or 26) rated FIU performance in countering traditional 
means of financial crime as either good or very good while only 20% (or 10) did so for 
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Table 5-2: Summary of U.S. and Non-U.S. Respondents’ Views on FIU Performance 
 
 Before 9/11 
 
After 9/11 
 
Traditional 
Financial 
Crime 
Non- 
Traditional 
Financial 
Crime 
Performance 
(%) 
U.S. 
% 
(n=49) 
Non-
U.S. 
% 
(n=50) 
U.S. 
% 
(n=49) 
Non-
U.S. 
% 
(n=50) 
U.S. 
% 
(n=49) 
Non-
U.S. 
% 
(n=50) 
U.S. 
% 
(n=49) 
Non-
U.S. 
% 
(n=48) 
Poor 36 40 12 36 10 10 46 36 
Fair 42 30 34 32 32 34 30 32 
Good 16 24 32 18 40 36 14 18 
Very Good 4 6 18 6 12 16 6 6 
Excellent - - 2 4 4 4 - 4 
Mann-
Whitney 
Rank (p-
value) 
0.458 0.735 0.940 0.443 
 
non-traditional means. Outside the U.S., the results were exactly the same for the 
traditional means of financial crime while 24% (or 12) of the respondents rated their 
respective FIU‘s performance as good or very good in countering non-traditional 
methods of financial crime. The difference in ratings between FIU performance in 
countering traditional and non-traditional methods of financial crime could be attributed 
to the following. Regulation of sectors through which traditional financial crime is 
committed increased immediately after the terrorist attacks early this decade. Regulation 
of sectors through which non-traditional financial crime is committed has only just begun 
to be addressed. 
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II. Money laundering is the most powerful driver of financial crime while political 
short-sightedness is the most significant impediment in successfully countering 
financial crime/terrorism. 
Initial research for the study suggested that money laundering is the biggest driver 
of financial crime. Survey respondents confirmed this. On a scale of 5, drug and 
criminally-related money laundering received the highest average rating both within (4.5) 
and outside the United States (4.1). In the United States, both misuse of informal banking 
systems (Hawalas) and trade-based financial crime received the next highest average 
ratings at 3.8 followed by misuse of charities at 3.4. Outside the United States, trade-
based financial crime was a close second with an average rating of 3.9 while misuse of 
informal banking systems (Hawalas) and misuse of charities were next with average 
ratings of 2.7. A summary of the ratings is presented in the table below. 
Table 5-3: U.S. and Non-U.S. Respondents’ Perceptions of Drivers and Impediments 
of Money Laundering 
 
DRIVER 
(RATING 
SCALE: 1 – 5) 
RESPONDENT IMPEDIMENT 
(RATING 
SCALE: 1 – 5) 
RESPONDENT 
U.S. NON-U.S. U.S. NON-U.S. 
Drug and 
criminally-
related money 
laundering  
4.5 
(n=50) 
4.1  
(n=50) 
Lack of 
performance 
metrics  
3.3 
(n=48) 
3.0 
(n=50) 
Misuse of 
informal banking 
systems 
(Hawalas)  
3.8 
(n=49) 
2.7 
(n=50) 
 
Political short-
sightedness   
3.7 
(n=49) 
3.2 
(n=50) 
Misuse of 
charities  
3.4 
(n=49) 
2.7 
(n=50) 
Fragmented 
legislative 
oversight   
3.6 
(n=50) 
2.7 
(n=50) 
Trade-based 
money 
laundering and 
financial crime 
3.8 
(n=49) 
3.9 
(n=50) 
A number of 
crime-fighting 
agencies with 
overlapping 
3.4 
(n=49) 
2.8 
(n=50) 
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responsibilities   
 
When it came to the impediments in countering financial crime, lack of 
performance metrics was expected to be the biggest of these since performance measures 
cannot be established without an organization having vision. Not so. In the United States, 
political short-sightedness was the most common response with an average rating of 3.7 
followed closely by fragmented legislative oversight with an average rating of 3.6, a 
number of crime-fighting agencies with overlapping responsibilities at 3.4 and lack of 
performance metrics at 3.3. Outside the United States, political short-sightedness was 
again the highest rated response with an average rating of 3.2 followed by lack of 
performance metrics with an average rating of 3.0, a number of crime-fighting agencies 
with overlapping responsibilities with an average rating of 2.8 and fragmented legislative 
oversight with an average rating of 2.7. These results did not match initial findings.  
When it comes to terrorist financing, governments‘ lack of vision, one can argue, 
has resulted in ineffectiveness in countering it. By increasing the level of regulation in 
vulnerable sectors or freezing the assets of suspected persons or entities, the government 
is merely pushing terrorists to find alternative means of financing their activities and ―law 
enforcement does not just lose a conviction, but it may be unable to trace the funds as 
extensively as may be required to interrupt operations or to find those linked to terrorist 
networks.‖372 This is particularly significant considering that those caught are, generally, 
lower down in the chain of command of the terrorist group and have limited contribution 
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in masterminding terrorist attacks.
373
 One report even suggests that ―SARs did not, nor 
should they have, nor would they now, discover any of the financial activity in which the 
September 11 hijackers engaged.‖374 
 
III. Intelligence agencies are underfunded. 
 The observed differences between the U.S. and non—U.S. groups, when it comes 
to determining if funding gaps exist, have no statistical significance. However, the 
observed difference between the groups when it comes to the extent of the shortfall is 
statistically significant. Soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Fareed 
Zakaria, in his column for Newsweek magazine, predicted the U.S. government‘s course 
of action in the ‗war on terror‘ would be to throw money at the problem. This makes 
sense since adequate funding has been a problem in this ‗war.‘ Zakaria asserts that there 
is a pressing need to shore up the country‘s intelligence capabilities rather than its 
military strength.
375
 An overwhelming majority (70% or 35) of the total U.S. experts are 
of the opinion that current FIU funding is not at the level where it should be. However, 
they felt that the funding gap wasn‘t big with 72% (or 36) of the total respondents 
indicating that it was within 50%. With regard to the respondents outside the U.S., 56% 
(or 28) of the total respondents agreed that current FIU funding is not at the level that it 
should be with 70% (or 35) of these respondents estimating this gap to be up to 50%.  
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Table 5-4: U.S. and Non-U.S. Respondents’ Estimation of Gaps in FIU Funding 
 
Level of 
Funding Gap 
 
RESPONDENT Range of 
Shortfall 
(%) 
RESPONDENT 
U.S. % 
(n=49) 
NON-U.S. 
% 
(n=50) 
U.S. % 
(n=50) 
NON-U.S. 
% 
(n=46) 
Grossly 
Underfunded  
14 8 1-10%  18 26 
Underfunded  56 48 11-25%   18 26 
Adequately 
Funded  
26 42 26-50%   36 18 
Overfunded 2 3.9 51-75%   16 16 
Grossly 
Overfunded 
- - 76-100% 10 6 
Mann-Whitney 
Rank (p-value) 
0.505 Mann-Whitney 
Rank (p-value) 
0.039 
 
As seen in the table above, the results confirm expectations that not enough is 
spent on intelligence geared towards countering financial crime. In the editorial 
mentioned above, Zakaria emphasized the importance of gathering of information on 
organizations and people responsible for planning and carrying out terrorist acts such as 
those that took place on 9/11. He suggested investing, in wiretapping and satellite 
equipment but mainly in human intelligence, ―We need, for example, to shore up an 
important weapon in our arsenal--covert operations. They remain the best way to 
penetrate a terrorist organization, foil a plot or pre-empt an attack on the United 
States.‖376 
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IV. FIUs can improve performance by focusing on outcome measures. 
 The utility of performance measures by financial intelligence agencies is the core 
concept of this study. When asked to rate the utility or appropriateness of selected 
performance measures, respondents confirmed expectations that government agency 
performance in fighting financial crime would be enhanced with a strong emphasis on 
outcome monitoring. Among the twelve measures categorized on the basis of business-
related measures, customer-related measures, learning and growth-related measures, 
finance-related measures, and outcome measures, respondents ranked two outcome 
measures in the top three and three of them in the top six. Following is respondents‘ 
ranking order of performance measures from highest to lowest: 
1) The value of intelligence that leads to interdiction and prevention of financial 
crime. 
2) The accuracy and timeliness of suspicious transaction reports. 
3) The number of financial criminals convicted. 
4) The number of support functions provided to reporting agencies, partner agencies 
and law enforcement. 
5) The number of repeat offenders. 
6) The amount of laundered money interdicted in relation to the estimated total 
amount of laundered money. 
7) The number and dollar value of suspicious transactions identified annually. 
8) The total number of financial criminals interdicted in relation to the estimated 
number of financial criminals. 
9) The number of employees that complete training. 
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10)  Percentage of payroll devoted to training. 
11) The dollar value of suspicious transactions identified annually in relation to the 
total amount of the budget. 
12) The dollar value of ‗dirty money‘ interdicted per employee. 
The table below displays the U.S. and non-U.S. respondent average ratings of selected 
performance measures that were either suggested by interviewees or currently being used 
by FIUs. 
Table 5-5: U.S. and Non-U.S. Respondent Ratings of Performance Measures (Rating 
Scale: 5 = More Appropriate, 1 = Less Appropriate  
 
Measure Type U.S. Rating 
by 
Frequency 
Average 
U.S. Ratings 
Non-U.S. 
Rating by 
Frequency 
Average Non-
U.S. Ratings  
Business Process-
related Measures  
 
n(5) = 25 
n(4) = 38 
n(3) = 23 
n(2) =  7 
n(1) =  4 
3.8 n(5) = 15 
n(4) = 33 
n(3) = 30 
n(2) = 14 
n(1) =   6 
3.4 
Customer-related 
Measures 
 
n(5) = 41 
n(4) = 39  
n(3) = 14 
n(2) =  3 
n(1) =  1 
4.2 n(5) = 22 
n(4) = 36 
n(3) = 25 
n(2) = 10 
n(1) =   5 
3.6 
Learning and 
Growth-related 
Measures 
 
n(5) =  9 
n(4) = 29  
n(3) = 31  
n(2) = 25 
n(1) =  4  
3.1 n(5) =   8 
n(4) = 17 
n(3) = 32 
n(2) = 32 
n(1) =   8 
2.9 
Finance-related 
Measures 
 
n(5) =   4  
n(4) = 19  
n(3) = 37  
n(2) = 22 
n(1) = 15 
2.8 n(5) =  5 
n(4) = 11 
n(3) = 32 
n(2) = 37 
n(1) = 10 
2.6 
Outcome 
Measures 
 
n(5) = 40   
n(4) = 58  
n(3) = 57  
n(2) = 27 
n(1) = 14 
3.4 n(5) = 39 
n(4) = 68 
n(3) = 42 
n(2) = 30 
n(1) = 17  
3.4 
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Suggested Best Practice Measures 
 There is constant debate on which outcome measures are most suitable in 
achieving results. One scholarly report calls for moving beyond using the dollar amount 
of a seizure as an indicator of performance to more concrete measures of outcomes such 
as the seniority of the interdicted person or persons within the terrorist organization.
377
 
Through an open-ended question, survey respondents suggested that FIUs target 
outcomes taking into account the following: 
 The number of SARs that are actually investigated and prosecuted (successfully 
or unsuccessfully); total SAR positives in relation to SARs received monthly, the 
dollar value of ‗dirty money‘ interdicted per state, SARs classified on the basis of 
financial sector, geographic zone, kind of economic activity, etc.;  
 the quality of feedback to financial institutions. Specifically, (a) the turn around 
time of the FIU in responding to financial institutions on their reporting of 
suspicious cases; (b) circulation of list of black-listed (criminals) names among 
financial institutions; and (c) sharing of information about new crimes with 
financial institutions; 
 the number of quality cases cleared and the number of interdictions that identify 
and negatively impact major money laundering organizations; 
 measured objectives relating to the number of arrests made from information 
provided by the FIU to the appropriate enforcement agency (FINCEN, etc)., 
convictions per dollar expenditure as well as prosecutions as a result of FIU data 
or analysis; 
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 peer to peer comparisons among banks about suspicious activity reporting, 
enhanced coordination between law enforcement and regulators, facilitated and 
frequent communication between banks and regulators about 
expectations/concerns/trends;  
 measured objectives relating to budgeted training costs, number of training 
programs provided and number of employees trained annually; and 
 the share of criminal proceeds that the police are allowed to keep (gainsharing). 
 
 
Key Findings 
 
This chapter set out to stamp mark the findings of the qualitative section of this 
study. The following is a recap of conclusions drawn from this chapter: 
1) Drug- and criminally-related money laundering is perceived as the main means of 
committing financial crime; international trade is an emerging trend. 
Government‘s lack of vision in tackling the problem is considered the biggest 
impediment to countering financial crime. 
2) U.S. and non-U.S. experts generally agree that America is more of a target for 
terrorists because of its unique position as a superpower and its representation as 
a vanguard of western civilization, secularism and values but U.S. intelligence 
agencies do not face a more difficult task in countering financial crime. 
3) Experts generally agree that FIU performance in countering financial crime 
committed through traditional methods via banks, credit unions, brokerage 
houses, insurance companies etc. has been good. However, FIU performance in 
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countering financial crime committed through non-traditional means like the 
informal banking system (Hawalas) and international trade has been poor. 
4) The performance of FIUs in countering financial crime before the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001 was poor in the opinion of experts who also felt that post-
September 11 changes brought about a marginal improvement in FIU 
performance. 
5) American FIUs are underfunded by as much as 50% in the view of most 
American experts. A majority of foreign experts felt that their respective FIUs 
were underfunded by a comparatively smaller margin - as much as 25%. 
6) Performance measures that are most useful are the value of intelligence that leads 
to interdiction and prevention of financial crime, the accuracy and timeliness of 
suspicious transactions reported, and the number of financial criminals convicted.  
 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter V puts in perspective what the literature review and the initial interviews 
revealed: the monitoring of outcomes is critical in achieving success in countering 
financial crime. Survey respondents were clearly in favor of FIUs moving beyond widget 
counting to more useful measures of performance, those that measure results. The survey 
also exposed the contrast in adapting the BSC to the private and public sectors. In the 
private sector, financial measures enjoy top billing but this is just the opposite when it 
comes to the public sector as evidenced by experts‘ low ratings of the suitability of 
financial performance metrics in helping counter financial crime. Here, the focus is on 
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cost efficiency rather than cost. The dissertation sought to answer if the BSC would be a 
suitable fit for this study and this segment of the study seemed to affirm this. 
Instead, aspects of the FIU business process that involved receiving reported 
information accurately and on time, the value of intelligence reported by the FIU to law 
enforcement and other intelligence agencies were seen as having more value, according 
to experts. The same can be said for the training of FIU personnel. Modern day 
organizations engage in operational training which is ―technical or specialized training to 
meet an organizational need or satisfy an organizational mandate for training in current or 
newly assigned work duties.‖378 Financial criminals are constantly exploiting the system 
by finding new ways to raise funds for their illegal activities. Hence, experts in the field 
determined that training of FIU personnel to detect these new methods was of utmost 
importance. Chapter VI summarizes the results of this study and helps answer the big 
story posed at its outset. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter is a recap of the conclusions from the qualitative and 
quantitative research sections of this study. It includes what constitutes effective 
performance for FIUs, and provides recommendations for improved practice based on the 
results of this study. Finally, it discusses the limitations of this study and opportunities for 
future research based on its findings. It begins with a summary of the results.   
Summary Of Research 
This study was undertaken to explore the possible lack of outcome measuring and 
monitoring in governments‘ fight against financial crime under the deployment of the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC). The type of government agency that this study particularly 
focused on was the financial intelligence unit (FIU) specially set up to gather and analyze 
financial intelligence due to the growing nature of the problem. The study assessed the 
functioning of the FIU through the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) prism and generally found 
that while some participants found this an effective means of looking at the problem, 
others did not. The starting point was to determine perceptions of the drivers of financial 
crime and the impediments to success in countering it. This study also shed light on 
performance measurement and outcome monitoring at a number of different levels 
including the influence of cultural factors on opinions, discussed in detail below. 
There is a common perception that while some government agencies across the 
globe have adopted performances measures, they have barely scratched the surface when 
it comes to monitoring outcomes. In the preliminary research for this study, it was found 
that the recent rise in terrorist activity has compelled governments to solidify existing 
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initiatives and adopt new ones within their borders to counter the financing of terrorist 
activity. These, generally, cover all levels of government and transcend a variety of 
sectors. Across borders, there is a pressing need for countries to collaborate and 
cooperate in intercepting funds of terrorists whose activities, in a number of cases, are 
trans-national. This study discussed a number of efforts such as the Wolfsberg Group and 
Basel Committee where entities from around the world have joined forces and put their 
heads together to tackle this problem collectively.  
While tightening of regulations has been the first plan of action in the playbook of 
countries affected by terrorism, relatively little action has been taken on the performance 
management front. The results of this study make it profoundly evident that 
organizational effectiveness of intelligence agencies can no longer take a backseat to anti-
terrorism legislation. In fact, the two must complement each other. In the case of 
financial crime, for example, much of the success of FIUs is dictated by what sectors its 
governing legislation allows it to monitor. Restrictions imposed by legislation, in this 
regard, were seen to have negatively affected the outcomes of FIU investigations in more 
than one country covered by this study. This is irrespective of the fact that the FIUs 
studied here are of the administrative type – they process and analyze reports of 
suspicious  transactions passed on to them and then pass these on to investigative and 
prosecutorial authorities; they have no law-enforcement or judicial authority. 
The FIUs (in this study) are subject to legislation that can be considered myopic 
(addressing the problem in the short-run), but the shortcomings in their operations are 
perceived to extend far and beyond this limitation. The participants in this study were 
FIU personnel and those associated with FIUs such as reporting entity personnel, law 
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enforcement, audit institution personnel, affiliated lawmakers, other intelligence 
personnel, former employees, civilian agents and consultants. A number of them felt that 
FIUs were found wanting when it came to the development and implementation of an 
outcome monitoring system. While the Dutch FIU lives by the sole metric of whether or 
not they are able to stop financial crime, the Australian, Canadian and American FIUs 
have a whole list of metrics which are, by and large, output-related. Experts 
recommended that FIUs set substantive targets and monitor progress towards them if they 
are to expect their performance in countering financial crime leapfrog from its current 
status. There were those that called for the current system of measuring the quantity of 
intelligence reports processed to be supplanted by the quality of intelligence reported. 
There were others who called for collective accountability, that is, a performance 
management system that would track financial intelligence from its source of 
dissemination to those responsible for indictment and prosecution of financial criminals. 
There were still others who called for performance comparisons between and among 
FIUs. 
The results of the interviews were corroborated by the results of the surveys 
which formed the next part of the study. This time, with the help of a larger group of 
experts, perceptions about the similarities and differences between American and foreign 
FIUs were measured. This exercise was intended to expose possible cultural differences 
between the two groups‘ thoughts in relation to i) the drivers of financial crime and 
impediments to countering it; ii) the performance of their respective FIUs in countering 
traditional and non-traditional methods of financial crime; iii) the performance of their 
respective FIUs before and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; iv) the 
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performance metrics most suitable to countering financial crime; and v) the shortfall in 
funding that deters their respective FIUs from performing effectively.  
In one sense, this exercise did not expose any cultural differences, as expected, as 
the only statistically significant difference in perceptions between American and foreign 
experts was in regard to the amount of funding shortfall experienced by their respective 
FIUs. In another sense, the opinions of one group of respondents were reinforced by the 
other group, thereby re-affirming perceptions on issues that were considered critical to 
this study. Culturally-influenced perceptions (or rather the lack of) aside, survey 
responses regarding the use of performance metrics overwhelmingly supported the 
hypothesis of the study: the success in countering financial crime is impacted by the 
focus, measurement and monitoring of outcomes by government intelligence agencies.  
A key ingredient of outcome-driven performance management is the metrics used 
to measure the impact of FIU efforts in fighting financial crime. Those suggested include 
the number of money launderers interdicted in proportion to the total number of money 
launderers, the amount of laundered money interdicted in proportion to the total amount 
of laundered money, the number of money launderers convicted, and the number of 
repeat offenders. These should be monitored over a period of time, so that FIUs and their 
financial-crime fighting partners can make necessary adjustments in planning and 
implementation. However, this comes with the caveat that the exact amount of ‗dirty‘ 
money is unknown leaving the success percentage of the financial-crime fighting regime 
a matter of conjecture. It is a foregone conclusion that outcome monitoring is more of a 
way to enhance the performance of FIUs rather than help them get rid of the problem 
completely.  
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Recommendations For Functional Improvement Of Financial Intelligence Units 
  
As stated at the outset, the BSC was the chosen framework for this study on 
account of its utility in examining all aspects of an organization‘s operations. The study 
progressed along the lines of the BSC‘s four perspectives and culminated with the 
following lessons learned based on the literature review, interviews and surveys. 
Business Process Perspective 
 The operations of the FIU should tie in with its mission, objectives and goals. 
Subsequently the FIU should possess the technological capability to achieve 
these. Study participants opined that terrorists are constantly finding new ways to 
finance their activities. Advancement in technology could help counter some of 
these. Technological strength can also enable an FIU to process, analyze and 
disseminate a larger volume of STRs, thereby making it more efficient. Data 
mining technologies can also help the FIU meet its regulatory obligations. For 
example, an FIU can use programs such as GIS to track and register businesses 
such as money service businesses which might otherwise be difficult to do.  
 Silos or bottlenecks existing within the FIU or the broader chain of authority 
should be dealt with effectively.
379
 If, for instance, the FIU decision-making 
process were to include employees to the greatest extent possible, it will eliminate 
feelings of isolation. Also, study participants stated that coordination among 
government agencies is a major impediment to fighting financial crime. The 
elimination of bottlenecks in the coordination process, will result in greater 
efficiency in countering financial crime.  
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 Some recipients expressed dissatisfaction over reports forwarded to them by 
FIUs. Therefore, the FIU should add value to the information it receives in order 
to fulfill its role and meet the expectations of entities that follow it in the chain of 
authority.
380
 An FIU that adopts a more integrated approach in its operations, that 
is, operates in unison with other players in the fight against financial crime such 
as reporting entities, law enforcement and prosecution can alleviate the risk of 
fragmentation.  
 An FIU must work to institute an effective mechanism that facilitates 
information-sharing and the avoidance of overlapping of duties among crime-
fighting agencies. As one interviewee suggested, the creation of a central czar that 
oversees financial crime prevention and controls operations can help facilitate 
this. 
 Along the same vein, well-drawn out MOUs between the FIU and reporting 
entities can enhance the quality of compliance inspections conducted by the FIU. 
This also increases the likelihood of regulated sectors meeting reporting 
requirements and reduces the possibility of them reporting what is not required. 
This addresses some of the major concerns expressed by reporting entities to 
FIUs. 
 An FIU can improve accountability through internal reviews and external 
evaluations. This will enable it to take corrective action to improve performance. 
While some FIUs already undergo these evaluations, others would certainly 
benefit from them. 
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 Relevant performance metrics suggested by study participants include the number 
of internal and external reviews/evaluations of the FIU, the rate of technological 
advancement made by the FIU, the number of times the FIU shares information, 
and the accuracy, timeliness and relevance of analyses conducted by the FIU. 
 
Customer Perspective 
 As study participants suggested, it is essential for an FIU to forge relationships 
with its public service counterparts to economize and at the same time, maximize 
the scope of efforts to counter financial crime. For example, partnerships with 
regulatory agencies can help avoid reporting redundancy, that is, reporting to 
more than one agency.  
 Reporting entities expressed a number of concerns in relation to compliance with 
FIU reporting requirements. Compliance on the part of reporting entities is key to 
the FIU performing its function; in turn, the FIU must keep in check 
administrative burdens or costs on reporting entities in order to encourage 
compliance. The FIU can also improve its relationships with reporting entities by 
providing clear guidelines or indicators as to what constitutes a suspicious 
transaction, thereby reducing complexity in the reporting process. FIU training of 
reporting entities in compliance will stem the flow of reported information that is 
not required from these entities to the FIU. 
 A structure and reliable instrument for feedback from reporting entity to FIU and 
back, and from FIU to law enforcement and back on case details can result in 
more effective communication among financial crime-fighting partners. This was 
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a point made by a number of study participants. Outreach programs, whether on 
an FIU‘s physical space or via technology, can also help win the confidence and 
cooperation of the FIU‘s customers. An FIU can also create goodwill by including 
its customers in the decision-making process through their participation in various 
advisory groups.  
 Cooperation extends beyond national borders and an FIUs can help other newly 
established, less developed FIUs catch up with the best among them by sharing 
operational and technical know-how. Study participants indicated that this is a 
widely prevalent practice. 
 Relevant performance metrics, according to study participants, include the degree 
of compliance costs imposed by the FIU on reporting entities, the number of 
support functions provided by the FIU to reporting agencies, partner agencies and 
law enforcement, the ratio of resources allocated by the FIU in serving regulated 
sectors to resources allocated in serving law enforcement and the FIU‘s 
contribution to an investigation, that is, the percentage of information provided by 
the FIU that is used in investigations. 
 
Learning and Growth Perspective 
 The private sector is an important source with respect to the hiring of FIU 
personnel. Many of the tasks performed by an FIU involve dealings with private-
sector entities such as banks, casinos, insurance companies, jewellers etc. It will 
benefit the FIU to hire those experienced in these businesses. Those with 
experience in law enforcement and other intelligence agencies are also valuable 
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assets to the agency. Former employees can be hired as external consultants. 
Intelligence analysis and technological expertise are also key to the FIU meeting 
performance targets. On the other hand, an FIU must find ways to attract the best 
and the brightest and avoid losing personnel to the private sector by offering 
competitive salaries and benefits that match the private sector‘s. FIU loss of 
employees to the private sector and the inability of FIUs to complete with higher 
private sector salaries are some of the grievances that study participants had.  
 Study participants also cautioned against underestimating the importance of 
workforce planning. Through skills inventory and gap analysis, an FIU can design 
training programs for its employees. Additionally, the FIU must ensure that 
personnel are well trained in the technical areas of the business so that they 
understand trends in money laundering and terrorist financing, constantly 
changing money laundering and terrorist financing methods and are able to 
properly analyze information received from reporting entities. Cross-functional 
training, both through courses and on-the-job, will help achieve this. Part of the 
training program should also include compliance with the FIU‘s rulebook on 
security and privacy.  
 The study revealed that FIUs are well aware of the importance of staff member 
training especially due to the highly technical nature of the job. From an 
organizational development perspective, FIU personnel attendance at workshops 
and conferences related to the field is integral. Through these and other avenues 
for interacting with the community outside the FIU, such as academicians and law 
enforcement, employees will gain different perspectives about the nature of the 
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FIU‘s work and hone a broad set of skills to provide solutions to problems. Since 
FIU work is computer-intensive in nature, the technical skills of personnel should 
constantly be upgraded. New FIU employees can certainly benefit from a 
mentorship program. It is also necessary for FIUs to ensure that their budgets for 
training keep up with the requirements of the job and are not cut as a result of 
government cutbacks. 
 In the context of performance appraisals, FIU personnel can be made to 
understand what is expected of them in relation to the priorities of the agency. 
They should also be allowed to provide input during the appraisal process in what 
is known as participatory performance appraisal.
381
 Employee performance 
should be linked to the agency‘s strategic plan. Regular performance evaluations 
and appraisals of personnel, at which their strengths and competencies are 
assessed, help achieve this. A rewards-based system recognizing individual as 
well as unit contributions to the performance of the agency can sustain motivation 
and instil a sense of empowerment among personnel. Study participants 
encouraged FIUs to be innovative in this area. In addition, newer methods of 
performance appraisals should be explored such as multisource or 360-degree 
appraisals where performance assessments are obtained from different sources 
such as customers that personnel deal with.
382
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 Relevant performance metrics that study participants suggested include the 
percentage of the FIU‘s budget allocated for training, the degree of learning plan 
development conducted by the FIU for its personnel, time worked at the job in 
relation to competencies acquired on the job and competencies acquired by FIU 
personnel in relation to the requirements of the job. 
 
Financial Perspective 
 The FIU must ―strive to produce what it must produce in a manner proportionate 
to its resources devoted to it‖383 A focus on outcomes in addition to the right 
amount and areas of investment will guide it in achieving this. Some study 
participants felt that FIUs‘ current focus on outputs is unproductive. Some others 
were of the opinion that too much is being invested in anti-terrorism security 
measures and not enough in terrorist financing. 
 Specifically, study participants advocated FIU investment in human resources to 
enhance functions such as compliance inspections of reporting entities, 
investigations that will end up being more timely and accurate, and analyses that 
helps investigations.  
 Additionally, study participants stressed the need for investment in technology 
related to reporting conduits, regulatory assignments, and data tracking and 
management systems. 
 Study participants suggested internal financial performance metrics including the 
ability of the FIU to meet its budget, improved efficiency in proportion to 
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investment and the amount of investment in human and technological resources in 
relation to the amount of financial crime deterred. They also suggested external 
financial performance metrics such as feedback from the FIU‘s stakeholders to 
gauge value for investment, the dollar value of ‗dirty money‘ interdicted per 
employee, and the number of prosecutions and convictions per dollar expenditure.  
It is noteworthy that FIU performance is dependent on the performance of other 
entities within the chain of authority as well. So performance metrics would work only to 
the extent of the cooperation of its partners fighting financial crime. While the 
effectiveness of FIUs has constraints, so does this study have limitations. These are 
discussed next. 
 
Limitations Of The Study And Areas For Future Research 
 
 While the study proceeded smoothly, there appeared to be some limitations in 
conducting it as planned. First, public entity performance dealing specifically with 
financial crime is an area that has been scarcely touched upon by public administration 
experts. Hence, literature on the subject was not easy to find. Secondly, a few potential 
participants like the National Criminal Intelligence Service (U.K.), the Belgian Financial 
Intelligence Processing Unit, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service declined to 
be interviewed for the study. Next, members of the bureaucracy interviewed for this 
study seemed constrained in responding to questions during the interview phase and, at 
times, expressed this sentiment. Behind the veneer of cooperation, they were restricted by 
the concern for the consequences of their responses. Finally, getting responses for the 
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survey required constant follow-up and the use of snowballing to secure the valid number 
of responses. 
Hopefully, this study will branch off further into less explored areas of terrorism 
or areas that have been researched without a consensus. These include: 
Inter-organizational Coordination: 
The ‗war on terror‘ is an initiative that goes beyond just involving the different 
levels of government; it incorporates the efforts of private enterprise, non-profits and the 
average citizen as well. This gives rise to potential problems which one study elucidates, 
―The lack of coordination and overlapping jurisdictions have resulted in fragmentation 
and often in redundancies within the system.‖384 Considering the inevitably, yet, 
vulnerability of partnerships in fighting ‗the war on terror,‘ the study suggests 
improvement of inter-organizational relationships within the operational, financial, legal-
regulatory, and political spheres.
385
 Often models appear good in theory but more 
research needs to be conducted on their practicality and suitability for coordinating the 
efforts of multiple players in the ‗war on terror.‘ 
 
Emerging Trends in Financial Crime 
We determined that terrorists are finding alternative means of terrorist financing 
as the authorities clamp down on more traditional means. The most prominent of these, as 
out survey respondents pointed out, is international trade. In fact, the FATF recently 
released a dossier Trade Based Money Laundering which specifies the typologies used by 
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terrorist financiers and money launderers to commit financial crime. However, this ploy 
by the terrorists extends beyond financial crime. They could potentially import terrorist 
material into a country because customs officials do not check the weights of these 
goods. Back to financial crime, one customs official pointed out, "We do get some 
customs questions generated by Operation Green Quest
386
, but it's difficult to get 
prosecutors or agents interested in this area."
387
 This is a niche in the area of financial 
crime that warrants further research given the volume of money moved through these 
means. 
 
The Role of the Financial Action Task Force 
The FATF‘s original scope of responsibility included money laundering until the 
attacks of September 11 when its responsibility was expanded to include terrorist 
financing. One report expresses the common sentiment on this, ―The inclusion of terrorist 
funding in the AML regime is far from gathering consensus, even among FATF experts 
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who, even before 9/11, expressed disagreement on this linkage.‖388 On a different note, 
the FATF conducts its mutual evaluations of member nations through panels of financial 
crime experts. However, the composition of these panels changes with the country under 
review. One of our interviewees raised a question about this procedure stating, ―Within 
the FATF, different panels evaluate different FIUs which leads us to ask if there is a 
political motivation between the FIUs.‖389 
 The most pressing among all of these issues is the lack of inter-organizational 
coordination and there remains an imminent need to establish a suitable model to 
smoothen out this process. Based on experience of this study, future research will be 
conducted along slightly modified guidelines from this study as follows: 
a) random sampling will be replaced by clustered sampling to allow all segments of 
the population in each jurisdiction to be included in the study; 
b) the multi-jurisdictional will be replaced by a bi-jurisdictional one to gain a more 
in-depth analysis of the problem and utilize limited resources more efficiently; 
and 
c) secure a stronger representation of legislators in the study who were difficult to 
reach for this one and generally, cautious in their responses.  
The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) methodology was found to be a useful one for a study of 
this nature. This study also proved the usefulness of applying the BSC to this arena and 
perhaps, could be a useful tool for internal agency reviews and external assessments 
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mentioned earlier. The study also resulted in other important revelations which are 
discussed below. 
 The findings of this study succinctly reveal the following. Experts, both American 
and non-American, see money laundering-related terrorist financing as the primary 
menace and newer methods of financial crime such as Hawalas and trade-based financial 
crime as looming threats. These experts also regard the tendency of the bureaucracy to 
take care of problems for the short-term as the foremost impediment to tackling financial 
crime. From an administrative stance, this study heard a loud and clear call for FIUs to 
move from widget-counting such as keeping track of the number of suspicious 
transactions received to more outcome-oriented metrics such as the quality of reports 
prepared in terms of timeliness, accuracy and level of utility to the receiving entity.  
The greater involvement of reporting entities, law enforcement and prosecution in 
fighting the good fight against financial crime is seen to potentially yield gains. These 
gains can be measured in terms of the number of financial criminals convicted, the 
number of repeat offenders, the total number of financial criminals interdicted in relation 
to the estimated number of financial criminals and the amount of laundered money 
interdicted in relation to the estimated total amount of laundered money. In the 
Introduction, outcome monitoring is defined as ―the regular (periodic, frequent) reporting 
of program results in ways that stakeholders can use to understand and judge those 
results.‖390 A judgment call to ascertain the contribution of the FIU in fighting financial 
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crime can only be made if it reports results periodically in ways that we, the public, can 
understand and measure. 
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Appendix A  
Channels Though Which Money Laundering Is Conducted  
 Proceeds of crime derived from the activities of traffickers, in both people and 
illicit drugs, gambling operations and organized criminal groups; 
 
 Money laundering as a means of disguising and hiding the proceeds of violent and 
serious crimes such as kidnapping, arms smuggling, hijacking, extortion, public 
corruption and crimes by terrorist groups;  
 
 Money laundering as a means of tax evasion; 
 
 The use and abuse of the services offered by offshore financial centers for the 
purposes of money laundering; 
 
 The increasing use of professionals, including lawyers and accountants, for the 
purposes of money laundering; 
 
 Structuring, or deliberately breaking down, currency transactions so as to avoid 
legal reporting requirements and detection; 
 
 Purchasing of bank drafts and bank checks, as a substitute for currency, and 
transporting the drafts and checks via couriers or through the postal service; 
 
 Physical removal of currency from jurisdictions by the making of false 
declarations or by the smuggling of large amounts through cargo containers or 
international courier services; 
 
 Traditional electronic movement of funds by means of bank transfers or transfers 
through financial advisors and insurance or security brokers; 
 
 Changes and innovations in technology that allow for undetected electronic 
movement of funds, such as transfers of funds over the internet, the purchase of 
goods and services over the internet with illegally derived funds and the use of 
emerging technologies such as stored-value cards; 
 
 Movement of currency and other forms of funds by means of non-traditional 
banking services, such as underground and alternative banks, currency exchange 
houses and remittance facilities;   
 
 The use of company formation agencies to form ‗shell‘ companies and the use of 
‗shell‘ companies to disguise the true ownership and source of illicit funds and to 
facilitate transfers of those funds; 
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 Transfer of proceeds of crime outside the jurisdiction for the purpose of 
investment, including the purchase of real estate; 
 
 The use of the gambling industry, including casinos, to transfer and disguise the 
proceeds of crime; and  
 
 The use of negotiable instruments and credit and debit cards to transfer and 
disguise the proceeds of crime. 
Source: Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering - Money Laundering Methods and 
Proceeds of Crime Typologies Workshop Public Summary Report  
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Appendix B  
Specified Unlawful Activities Under U.S. Laundering Laws 
Crime/Statute  
Aircraft piracy/Title 49, USC Sec. 46502  
Alien smuggling/Title 8, USC Secs. 1324*, 1327*, 1328*  
Arms export/Title 22, USC Sec. 2778(c)  
Bank fraud/Title 18, USC Sec. 1344*  
Bank robbery and burglary of government property/Title 18, USC Secs. 2113, 2114  
Bank Secrecy Act crimes/Title 31, USC Secs. 5322*, 5324*  
Bankruptcy fraud/Title 11, USC Sec. 101* and Title 18, USC Sec. 152  
Bribery/Title 18, USC Secs. 201*, 215, 224*  
Congressional or Cabinet officer assassination/Title 18, USC Sec. 351  
Conspiracy to kill, kidnap or maim a person or injure certain property in a foreign 
country/Title 18, USC Sec. 956  
 Contraband cigarettes, trafficking in/Title 18, USC Secs. 2341*, 2342*, 2343*, 2344*, 
2345*, 2346*  
Copyright infringement/Title 18, USC Sec. 2319**  
Counterfeit goods, trafficking in/Title 18, USC Sec. 2320*  
Counterfeiting and forgery/Title 18, USC Secs. 471*, 472*, 473*, 500, 501, 502, 503, 
513  
Customs crimes/Title 18, USC Secs. 542, 545, 549  
Destruction by explosives or fire of government property or property affecting interstate 
commerce/Title 18, USC Secs. 844(f), 844(i)  
Destruction of aircraft/Title 18, USC Sec. 32  
Embezzlement and theft/Title 18, USC Secs. 641, 656, 657, 658, 659, 664, 666, 669  
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Emergency Economic Powers Act crimes/Title 50, USC Sec. 1705  
Espionage/Title 18, USC Secs. 793, 794, 798  
Export crimes/Title 50, USC App. 2410  
Extortion and threats/Title 18, USC Sec. 875  
Extortionate credit transactions/Title 18, USC Secs. 892*, 893*, 894*  
Food stamp crimes/Title 7, USC Sec. 2024  
Foreign corrupt practices/Title 15, USC Secs. 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff  
Foreign law violations: extortion; fraud against a foreign bank; kidnapping; murder or 
destruction of property by means of explosive or fire; narcotics; robbery/Title 18, USC 
Sec. 1956(c)(7)(B)  
Fraud and false statements/Title 18, USC Secs. 1001, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1027, 
1028, 1029, 1032, 1035  
Gambling/Title 18, USC Sec. 1084*  
Health care fraud/Title 18, USC Secs. 287, 371, 1347  
Influencing, impeding or retaliating against federal official by threatening or injuring 
family member/Title 18, USC Sec. 115  
Kidnapping/Title 18, USC Secs. 1201, 1203  
Labor-management financial transaction fraud, union embezzlement/Title 29, USC Secs. 
186*, 501(c)*  
Mail fraud/Title 18, USC Sec. 1341*  
Mail, theft from/Title 18, USC Sec. 1708  
Malicious mischief/Title 18, USC Secs. 1361, 1363  
Murder on a federal facility/Title 18, USC Sec. 1111  
Murder of employees of the U.S./Title 18, USC Sec. 1114  
Murder of foreign officials, official guests or foreign protected persons/Title 18, USC 
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Sec. 1116  
Narcotics offenses/Title 21, Secs. 841, 842, 843, 844, 846, 848, 854, 856, 858, 859, 860, 
861, 863, 952, 953, 955, 957, 959, 960, 962, 963  
National resource conservation/Title 42, USC Sec. 6901  
Nationality and citizenship, unlawful procurement/Title 18, USC Secs. 1425*, 1426*, 
1427*  
Obscenity/Title 18, USC Secs. 1461*, 1462*, 1463*, 1464*, 1465*  
Obstruction of justice/Title 18, USC Secs. 1503*, 1510*, 1511*, 1512*, 1513*, 1518  
Ocean dumping/Title 33, USC Secs. 1401, 1901  
Passport and visa crimes/Title 18, USC Secs. 1542*, 1543*, 1544*, 1546*  
Peonage and slavery/Title 18, USC Secs. 1581*, 1582*, 1583*, 1584*, 1585*, 1586*, 
1587*, 1588*  
Presidential assassination, kidnapping or assault/Title 18, USC Sec. 1751  
Prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials/Title 18, USC Sec. 831  
Racketeering/Title 18, USC Secs. 1951*, 1952*, 1953*, 1954*, 1955*, 1956***, 
1957***, 1958*  
Securities, fraud in the sale of/(Undefined)****  
Sexual activity, transportation for illegal/Title 18, USC Secs. 2421*, 2422*, 2423*, 
2424*  
Sexual exploitation of children/Title 18, USC Secs. 2251*, 2251A*, 2252*, 2260*  
State felonies: arson, bribery, dealing in obscene matter, extortion, gambling, kidnapping, 
murder, robbery, narcotics/Title 18, USC Sec. 1961(1)(A)*  
Stolen property, trafficking in/Title 18, USC Secs. 2312*, 2313*, 2314*, 2315*, 2318*, 
2321*  
Tariff Act/Title 19, USC Sec. 1590 Terrorism/Title 18, USC Secs. 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 
2339A  
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Trading With The Enemy Act/Title 50, USC App. 16  
Unauthorized sound and video recordings, fixation and trafficking in/Title 18, USC Sec. 
2319A*  
Violence against maritime navigation and fixed platforms/Title 18, USC Secs. 2280, 
2281  
Violence at international airports/Title 18, USC Sec. 37  
Water pollution/Title 33, USC Sec. 1251 and Title 42, USC Sec. 300f  
Wire fraud/Title 18, USC Sec. 1343*  
* Incorporated from the definition of "racketeering activity" found in Title 18, USC Sec. 
1961, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  
** Copyright infringement is an SUA under the money laundering law (Title 18, USC 
Sec. 1956) and is incorporated from the U.S. RICO law (Title 18, USC Sec. 1961).  
*** When Congress incorporated the predicate acts of the RICO law, called "racketeering 
activity," it did not exclude the U.S. money laundering laws (Title 18, USC Secs. 1956 & 
1957). Thus, the anomaly exists that a money laundering violation is a "specified 
unlawful activity" under the money laundering laws (Title 18, USC Sec. 1961).  
**** "Fraud in the sale of securities," which is incorporated from the U.S. RICO law 
(Title 18, USC Sec. 1961), is not identified by a particular statute in the RICO law. 
 
Source: moneylaundering.com, 1999 
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Appendix C 
 
Organizations Whose Personnel Were Interviewed For This Study 
 
The Netherlands 
Court of Audit       
Melding Ongebruikelijke Transacties (MOT)  
Garanti Bank  
      
Canada 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) - Local and 
national offices 
Member of Parliament 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
 
The United States 
Financial Crime Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
Government Accountability Office  
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Global Consulting Services 
Defense and Former Prosecutorial Lawyers 
 
Australia 
Australian Institute of Criminology 
Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) 
Independent Consultant 
 
Financial Action Task Force 
 
European Commission 
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Appendix D 
 
Sample Questionnaire Used For Interviews 
 
INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS 
1) What is your dealing with FATF‘s member FIUs? Please discuss, on a general 
level, their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis).  
What steps have been taken to improve effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
post-9/11? 
2) How do you think member FIUs should define success? For example, would you 
consider it a success if member FIUs‘ investigations resulted in 50% of money 
launderers being caught? What, in your opinion, are the factors that lead to 
success for member FIUs? What are the impediments to success? 
3)  
QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE BALANCED SCORECARD 
Business Process Perspective 
a) How would you assess the processes and procedures followed by member FIUs? 
What measures of performance do you think they should use to improve business 
processes? 
 
Customer Perspective 
b) Who are member FIUs‘ customers? How would you assess member FIUs in the 
performance of their duties and service to them? What measures of performance 
do you think they should use to improve customer satisfaction? 
 
Learning and Growth Perspective 
c) How would you assess the staff at member FIUs? Do you have any suggestions 
for the way they are trained? What measures of performance do you think they 
should use for staff? 
 
Financial Perspective 
d) Which area or programs in financial crime is investment needed in and how will 
FIUs benefit from this? How do you suggest they measure financial performance? 
 
GENERAL QUESTION 
4) Do you have any suggestions for member FIUs to improve:   
a) implementation 
b) information-sharing or  
c) strengthening its planning process, both short- and long-term? 
 
COMPARATIVE QUESTIONS 
5) How do member FIUs compare? Do you use any international comparators?  
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TECHNICAL QUESTION 
6) How would you evaluate member FIUs focus on financial crime committed 
through:  
a) international trade through the abnormal pricing of goods?  
b)       the use of informal banking systems, credit/debit cards and the                
          Internet?   
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Appendix E  
 
Survey To Assess The Performance of Financial Intelligence Units in Countering 
Financial Crime 
 
This is a survey directed towards a study on financial intelligence units (FIUs). Please fill 
out ALL responses to the best of your knowledge. Responses will be treated in 
confidence. 
 
For the purpose of this study:  
 ‗financial crime‘ is defined as terrorist financing and related money laundering 
and tax evasion.  
 
 FIU is defined as ―a central agency to receive, analyze, and disseminate financial 
information to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.‖ (IMF/World 
Bank, 2004) eg. FINCEN, FBI, IRS – Criminal Investigations, AUSTRAC, 
FINTRAC, MOT 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If requested, I would be happy to send you 
a copy of the results. 
 
I. Perceived Threats and Impediments 
 
Success in interdicting money laundering is likely to be based on accurate assessment of 
threats.   
 
A.  Please rate the seriousness/probability of the following drivers of money 
laundering: 
 
a) Drug and criminally-related money laundering 
 
Low Probability/Threat    1    2    3    4    5    High Probability/Threat     
 
b) Misuse of informal banking systems (Hawalas)     
 
Low Probability/Threat    1    2    3    4    5    High Probability/ 
 
c) Misuse of charities 
 
Low Probability/Threat    1    2    3    4    5    High Probability/ 
 
d) Trade-based money laundering and financial crime    
 
Low Probability/Threat    1    2    3    4    5    High Probability/ 
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B. Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5 the following impediments to successful financial 
crime fighting with 1 indicating low salience and 5 indicating high salience: 
   
a) Lack of performance metrics 
 
Low Salience      1    2    3    4    5    High Salience 
b) Political short-sightedness     
 
Low Salience      1    2    3    4    5    High Salience 
 
c) Fragmented legislative oversight   
 
Low Salience      1    2    3    4    5    High Salience 
 
d) A number of crime-fighting agencies with overlapping responsibilities 
 
Low Salience      1    2    3    4    5    High Salience 
 
 
C. America‘s status as a superpower makes it a target for terrorists more than any other 
country. 
 
Strongly Disagree  1    2    3    4    5 Strongly Agree 
 
 
II. Performance 
 
These questions are directed towards determining how well the government, specifically, 
FIUs have performed in countering financial crime.   
 
A. Please let us know how you would rate: 
 
a) the performance of FIUs in countering terrorist financing through traditional financial 
institutions such as banks, credit unions, brokerage houses, insurance companies etc.? 
 
Poor    Fair    Good    Very    Good  Excellent    
 
b) the performance of FIUs in countering terrorist financing through NON-traditional 
financial systems such as hawalas and international trade? 
 
Poor    Fair    Good    Very    Good  Excellent    
 
c) the performance of FIUs before the events of September 11, 2001? 
 
Poor    Fair    Good    Very    Good  Excellent    
 
d) the performance of FIUs after the events of September 11, 2001? 
 
Poor    Fair    Good    Very    Good  Excellent    
 
e) In your opinion, out of every dollar laundered, FIUs should interdict __________ 
cents.  
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f)  American FIUs face a more difficult task interdicting ―dirty money‖ than their foreign 
counterparts. 
 
Strongly Disagree  1    2    3    4    5 Strongly Agree 
 
 
B. Please let us know how you would rate (in your country of location): 
 
a) the current level of FIU funding relative to need? 
 
Grossly underfunded    Underfunded    Adequately funded    Overfunded   Grossly Overfunded 
 
b) what is the gap between current funding and what you believe is needed to address the 
threat? 
 
1-10%  11%-25%    26%-50%    51%-75%     76%-100%    
 
 
III. Performance Metrics 
 
Some FIUs use performance measures to improve performance while others do not. The 
use of performance measures could potentially help FIUs improve their operations. These 
measures are currently being used by FIUs or have been suggested by experts in the field.  
 
Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5 the utility of the following measures with 1 being less 
appropriate and 5 being more appropriate: 
 
A. Business Process-related Measures 
 
a) the number and dollar value of suspicious transactions identified annually 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
b) the accuracy and timeliness of suspicious transaction reports  
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
B. Customer-related Measures 
 
a) the number of support functions provided to reporting agencies, partner agencies and 
law enforcement 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
b) the value of intelligence that leads to interdiction and prevention of financial crime 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
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C. Learning and Growth-related Measures 
 
a) percentage of payroll devoted to training 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
b) the number of employees that complete training 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
D. Finance-related Measures 
 
a) the dollar value of suspicious transactions identified annually in relation to the total 
amount of the budget  
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
b) the dollar value of ‗dirty money‘ interdicted per employee 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
E. Outcome Measures 
a) the total number of financial criminals interdicted in relation to the estimated number 
of financial criminals  
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
b) the amount of laundered money interdicted in relation to the estimated total amount of 
laundered money 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
c) the number of financial criminals convicted 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
d) the number of repeat offenders 
 
Less Appropriate  1    2    3    4    5     More Appropriate 
 
 
IV. Demographics 
 
a) Which country are you located in? 
 
USA   
 
Other  
 
b)  Which of the following categories best describes your current job affiliation: 
 
FIU reporting entity – financial institution 
 
 176 
FIU reporting entity – non-financial institution 
 
Legislator  
 
Regulator/Policy Analyst/Government Auditor 
 
Law Enforcement 
 
Academician 
 
Consultant 
 
Other: _________________ 
  
c)  How many years have you been in your current position: _______________ 
 
d)  What is your level of education: 
 
High-School    Some College    College Graduate    Masters Ph.D./J.D. 
 
 
Additional comments: 
What measures you would use to judge the efficiency and effectiveness of FIU‘s: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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